• Personalised AI Ads: Google is rolling out personalised advertising within its AI shopping tools to monetise free chatbot users and compete with OpenAI.
• Exclusive Offers: Advertisers can present exclusive deals to shoppers using Google’s Gemini-powered AI mode while preparing to buy items.
• Monetisation Push: The initiative expands Google’s effort to monetise popular AI chatbots, leveraging Gemini 3 to challenge OpenAI’s GPT-5.
• Alternative to Search Ads: The feature shifts beyond traditional sponsored search ads by offering flexible deals like lower prices, bundles, or free shipping.
• Behaviour-Based Triggers: Google’s AI will determine when to display offers based on shopping behavior and likely purchases.
• Competition in Ecommerce: Other AI firms such as OpenAI, Microsoft, and Perplexity are also integrating ecommerce capabilities to generate revenue.
• Commerce Protocol: Google introduced a universal commerce protocol enabling shopping agents to research and buy without leaving its platform alongside partners like Walmart and Shopify.
• Offer Creation: Retailers can set up deals, with Google’s AI choosing optimal timing; initial pilots focus on discounts before expanding to bundles and free shipping.

Google is introducing new personalised advertising into its AI shopping tools, as it seeks to make money from the hundreds of millions of people who use its chatbot for free and gain market share from rival OpenAI.

Advertisers will be able to present exclusive offers to shoppers who are preparing to buy an item through Google’s AI mode, which is powered by its Gemini model, the Alphabet-owned tech giant announced on Sunday.

The move marks a push by Google to gain an edge in the race to monetise popular chatbots, as it looks to build on the success of its latest large language model, Gemini 3, which has gained ground against OpenAI’s GPT-5.

It also represents a move away from the tech giant’s traditional ‘sponsored’ ad placements in search results, which generate tens of billions of dollars for the company but has come under threat by the rise of AI chatbots.

“It is a new concept that moves beyond our traditional search ads model,” said Vidhya Srinivasan, vice-president of Google Ads and Commerce.

“It essentially gives retailers the flexibility to deliver value to people shopping in AI mode, whether that’s a lower price, a special bundle or free shipping. In the moment, it matters most . . . to just close the sale,” she added.

Google’s AI will determine when to display an offer based on users’ shopping behaviour and what they are likely to purchase

Google’s new ads feature will see it move a step forward from its AI rivals by enabling brands to offer highly personalised advertising through its chatbot, such as a discount code.

Last month, OpenAI put on hold internal discussions about advertising products after chief executive Sam Altman declared a “code red” over the need to improve ChatGPT, amid concerns rivals were narrowing its early lead in the race to develop the cutting-edge technology.

Google is leveraging its huge market share in online search to put its AI model in front of billions of users, via the “AI Mode” that it added to search pages last year. Its standalone chatbot Gemini still lags ChatGPT in popularity.

AI groups, including OpenAI, Microsoft and Perplexity, have rushed to launch ecommerce features in their chatbots over the past year as they hunt for new ways to generate revenue from their popular but costly AI products.

OpenAI has been rolling out its checkout feature, first reported by the FT, which sees the AI start-up take a cut of the sales made on ChatGPT.

Microsoft launched its Copilot Checkout on Thursday, which also provides users with recommendations and checkout in its AI chats. The group said shopping through Copilot led to 53 per cent more purchases within 30 minutes of interaction compared to those without.

Google also introduced a “universal commerce protocol”, which it said would enable shopping agents to research products and make purchases without leaving its platform. The protocol was developed with large retailers and marketplaces including Walmart, Target and Shopify.

“We need to work together. I think if we do it well, it’s an extraordinary expansionary moment,” Google chief executive Sundar Pichai said at the National Retail Federation’s annual show in New York.

Google’s new ads feature will make use of the contextual information from peoples’ conversation with the chatbot in AI mode, and trigger offers on relevant products that user have clicked on.

Retailers can set up offers they want to be available, with Google then using AI to determine when it is best to display the deal to a potential customer.

Srinivasan said Google was “initially focusing on discounts for the pilot and will expand to support the creation of offers with other attributes that help shoppers prioritise value over price alone, such as bundles and free shipping”.

Existing Google shopping partners include pet brand Petco and make-up retailer e.l.f. Cosmetics and luggage manufacturer Samsonite.

Additional reporting by Gregory Meyer in New York

• Justification: ICE officer justified in deadly force use because driver refused to stop and posed threat while evading detention.
• Authority: ICE Special Agents have criminal investigator authority, can detain or arrest U.S. citizens obstructing Title 8 or Title 18 enforcement.
• Federal Law: Title 18 U.S.C. §111 criminalizes interference with federal officers, with escalating penalties when contact, intent, or weapons are involved.
• Assault Definition: Assault on federal officer includes threats creating fear of harm even without physical contact, as affirmed in Eighth Circuit jury instructions and cases like Yates and Street.
• Vehicle as Weapon: Courts, including Eighth Circuit in Wallace, recognize automobiles used aggressively as deadly weapons even absent impact, mirroring facts in Renee Good case.
• Reasonableness: Fourth Amendment reasonableness for deadly force considers officer’s perception of imminent threat to self or others, referencing Garner, Graham, Scott, Plumhoff, Barnes.
• Totality: Barnes v. Felix emphasizes totality of circumstances without temporal limits, including prior conduct and public safety risks from fleeing driver.
• Evidence: Photographic sequence shows driver shifting into drive, aligning vehicle toward officer, prompting immediate weapon draw and lethal force in self-defense and defense of others.

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The Image above proves the ICE Officer was justified in his decision to use deadly force. He had no obligation to step out of the way that would benefit her or subject him to prosecution. He had no obligation to allow her to drive away from an attempt to detain her after the Officer at the door of her car ordered her to stop and exit the vehicle.

ICE has two sets of law enforcement personnel — Special Agents who are criminal investigators, and deportation officers who process civil deportation cases. Special Agents are covered by GS-1811 series position with a general description of “criminal investigator.” They are armed and possess police powers to investigate and make arrests for any crime committed in their presence, as well as for the enforcement of all crimes under Title 8 of the United States Code — “Aliens and Nationality.” Within their authority are crimes under Title 18 such as “conspiracy” and “obstruction” that intefere with their enforcement of the provisions of Title 8.

But the claim floating around social media that ICE officers have no jurisdiction over U.S. citizens is simply wrong. They are law enforcement officers with the authority to detain citizens briefly as part of their investigatory powers, and to arrest citizens who conspire to obstruct and/or do actually obstruct their lawful operations.

Title 18 U.S.C. Sec. 111 is a federal criminal statute involving interference with federal law enforcement:

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Section 1114 includes within its designation “any officer or employee of the United States or of any agency in any branch of the United States Government (including any member of the uniformed services) while such officer or employee is engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties….”

Subsection (a)(1) makes it a federal crime: assault, resist, oppose, impede, intimidate, or interfere with such employees while they are engaged in or on account of their performance of their official duties.

Without more, such a crime is subject to a maximum penalty of up to 1 year in prison — a misdemeanor.

However, where such acts involve “physical contact” with the officer, or an intent to commit another felony, the maximum penalty increases to 8 years — a felony.

Finally, if in the commission of the offense the defendant uses a “deadly or dangerous weapon”, or “inflicts bodily injury” on the officer, the maximum penalty increases to 20 years.

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, with includes the District of Minnesota, has adopted the Manual of Model Jury Instructions to define the elements of certain crimes. Under the Model Instruction 6.18.111, “assault” on a federal officer is defined as:

An “assault” is any intentional and voluntary attempt or threat to do injury to the person of another, when coupled with t_he apparent present ability to do so_ sufficient to put the person against whom the attempt is made in fear of immediate bodily harm.7

Footnote 7: The statute prohibits any acts or threats of bodily harm that might reasonably that might reasonably deter a federal official from the performance of his or her duties. Even if there is no physical contact, the force requirement is satisfied even if the defendant’s conduct places the officer in fear for his life or safety. See United States v. Yates … United States v. Street.…

In Yates, the defendant aimed his truck at a police vehicle as he was driving, but the officer was able to steer away and avoid a collision, i.e., no “contact.”

In the Street case, the incident involved only verbal threats to kill the officers, but no contact. The Eighth Circuit noted how broadly Congress chose to write Sec. 111:

In enacting Section(s) 111, Congress intended broadly to prohibit harm or threats thereof to certain federal officials…. "In order to protect the law enforcement function itself, the statute must be read as prohibiting any acts or threats of bodily harm that might reasonably deter a federal official from the performance of his or her duties." … Congress created the single crime of harming or threatening a federal official, and specified six ways by which the crime could be committed.

Case law across the country has held that any kind of instrument that can be employed as a weapon — even if designed for another purpose — satisfies this provision. Not surprisingly, case law across the country is replete with instances where automobiles were used for purposes other than transportation, with the driver turning them into weapons.

In 2017, the Eighth Circuit decided United States v. Wallace. In that case the defendant was charged with using her vehicle as a deadly or dangerous weapon in the parking lot of a VA Hospital. She was convicted under Sec. 111(b), and sentenced to 48 months in prison. The guideline range was 188-235 months.

"[F]or a car to qualify as a deadly weapon, the defendant must use it as a deadly weapon and not simply as a mode of transportation." United States v. Arrington , 309 F.3d 40, 45 (D.C. Cir. 2002). For instance, using a car "purely for flight" would not trigger liability under § 111(b). …. The jury could nevertheless have reasonably found that by driving toward Atlas and forcing him to jump on the hood to avoid being hit, Wallace used the car as something other than transportation—that she used it as a deadly or dangerous weapon.

The facts of Wallace were that a federal police officer approached the vehicle in a VA parking lot after he observed a person walk to and enter the vehicle after he directed her to stop. The driver then backed the vehicle out of a parking stall, ignoring the officer’s commands that she stop. After the driver had backed out of the parking stall, the officer positioned himself in front of the stationary vehicle and yelled to the driver "Shut the vehicle off. Get out of the vehicle. Police."

When Wallace did not comply, Atlas grabbed his gun. When he saw the kids, though, he holstered it and told Wallace again to shut the car down. But the car lunged forward toward Atlas, who, in his words "instinctively jumped, and I landed on the hood." Atlas jumped on the hood to avoid being struck as "[t]he vehicle came at me."

As noted, Wallace was convicted of violating Sec. 111(b) — assault on a federal police officer while using a vehicle as a deadly weapon.

She did not strike the officer with the vehicle — he jumped on the hood to avoid behind hit.

Does this sound familiar?

The point is that Renee Good committed an aggravated felony against the ICE Officer before he drew his weapon and fired his first shot.

IT DOES NOT MATTER WHETHER SHE ACTUALLY STRUCK HIM WITH HER VEHICLE.

As the jury instruction states, the assault is complete “if the defendant’s conduct places the officer in fear for his life or safety…”

That means that when the ICE Officer fired his weapon, he was attempting to “seize” a fleeing felon. All uses of force — lethal and non-lethal — to immobilize a suspected criminal offender are “seizures.” The Fourth Amendment requires that seizures be “reasonable” in order to comply with the Fourth Amendment.

The use of deadly force is a reasonable seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes when engaged in for self-defense responding to conduct that is reasonably perceived by the officer to pose a threat of death or serious bodily injury to him or others around him.

This is the second legal point that is being widely mischaracterized on social media — the Officer’s perception of an imminent threat of death or bodily injury is not limited just to the threat to himself, it is what he perceives as a threat to himself AND others in his immediate vicinity and the broader community in the direction of the vehicle’s intended travel.

What follows is a BRIEF recap of Supreme Court decisions over the past 40+ years dealing with officer-involved shootings under the Fourth Amendment and the inherent right of self-defense and defense of others.

Modern changes in the use of deadly force as a law enforcement tool began with the Supreme Court’s decision in Tennessee v. Garner to move away from the common law rule that allowed such force to be used against “fleeing felons.” An interesting factual tidbit that underpinned that common law rule was at the founding was that nearly all “felonies” were punishable by death.

Tennessee v. Garner — 1985:

This case DOES NOT involve the issue of self-defense by an officer in fear. Prior to Garner, there was a view that a “fleeing felon” was — by virtue of that fact — a danger to the community even if not to the officer at the time of the encounter.

The facts were that at 10:45 pm two officers responded to a “prowler” call by a neighbor who heard a window breaking at the house next door. One officer went into the back yard and saw an Garner running away from the house in the direction of a chain-link fence. He shouted to the suspect “Police, halt” and moved towards him. As he did Garner began to climb the fence. Fearing he would evade arrest if he made it over the fence, the officer fatally shot him. A Tennessee statute authorized police to use “all force necessary” to make an arrest if, after an intention to arrest is announced, the suspect flees or forcibly resists.

The officer stated he was not fearful for his life or safety. He saw no sign of a weapon, and, though not certain, was "reasonably sure" and "figured" that Garner was unarmed. Tennessee statute justified deadly force on the basis that an un-apprehended felony posed a danger to the community. The Supreme Court took up the case to decide whether such actions were “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment when the only purpose for using deadly force was to prevent escape and there was no factual basis to conclude the suspect was actually a threat to the community if not arrested.

Here is the landmark ruling by the Supreme Court on the Fourth Amendment, moving away from the common law:

The use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable…. Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so. It is no doubt unfortunate when a suspect who is in sight escapes… A police officer may not seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead. The Tennessee statute is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes the use of deadly force against such fleeing suspects.

It is not, however, unconstitutional on its face. Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force. Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape.

That is the law, and has been the law for 40 years.

Did the ICE Officer in Minneapolis have “probable cause” to believe Ms. Good had committed a crime involving the threatened infliction of serious physical harm? If yes … “deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape.”

As noted above, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon on a federal law enforcement officer does NOT require actual physical contact or injury to the officer. Whether Good hit the ICE Officer or not does not change the “reasonableness” determination.

Graham v. Connor — 1989.

Four years after Garner, the Supreme Court held that the question of “reasonableness” under the Fourth Amendment with respect to claims of “excessive force” used by law enforcement officers to make an arrest. Connor is not a “deadly force” case, but does establish the framework for determining whether the force used — deadly or otherwise — was “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.

Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in a 9-0 decision, held that excessive force claims during any “seizure” of a person must be evaluated under an “objective reasonableness” test that looks at whether the officer’s actions were reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances, without regard to subjective intent or motivations of the officer.

The “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight…. The Fourth Amendment is not violated by an arrest based on probable cause, even though the wrong person is arrested … nor by the mistaken execution of a valid search warrant on the wrong premises …. With respect to a claim of excessive force, the same standard of reasonableness at the moment applies: “Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers,” … violates the Fourth Amendment. The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments -- in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving -- about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.

The law on excessive force — even use of deadly force — tolerates mistakes. Based on the facts, I do not believe the ICE officer’s use of deadly force was a “mistake.” His reaction to what Ms. Good did in the 2-3 seconds before he fired his weapon were entirely justified by her actions.

[T]he question is whether the officers' actions are "objectively reasonable" in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation…. An officer's evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officer's good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional.”

What would a reasonable officer standing the shoes of the ICE Officer who fired at Ms .Good have perceived in terms of his safety or the safety of others from her actions during the moments leading up him using deadly force to stop her? Did he have reasonable cause to believe she had committed a violent crime, and that allowing her to evade arrest would constitute a threat to others even if she was past him and no longer at threat to him?

Scott v. Harris — 2005.

Scott involved a high speed chase where the police officer used the bumper of his vehicle to bring the chase to an end by causing the suspect’s car to crash. The suspect was rendered a quadriplegic and sued for use of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment on the basis that running him off the road was an “unreasonable” seizure.

Writing for an 8-1 majority, Justice Scalia stated:

[The Officer] defends his actions by pointing to the paramount governmental interest in ensuring public safety…. Thus, in judging whether [the Officer’s] actions were reasonable, we must consider the risk of bodily harm that [the Officer’s] actions posed to respondent in light of the threat to the public that [the Officer] was trying to eliminate. Although there is no obvious way to quantify the risks on either side, it is clear from the videotape that respondent posed an actual and imminent threat to the lives of any pedestrians who might have been present, to other civilian motorists, and to the officers involved in the chase.

It makes no difference that Ms. Good was only beginning to drive away when she was shot by the ICE Officer. It was not unreasonable to conclude that after almost running over a uniformed law enforcement officer when she was fully aware of his presence and after being ordered out of the car, she might continue to operate her vehicle in a way that put others present at risk, including other motorists in the direction she was intending to travel.

We think it appropriate in this process to take into account not only the number of lives at risk, but also their relative culpability. It was respondent, after all, who intentionally placed himself and the public in danger … that ultimately produced the choice between two evils that [the Officer] confronted. Multiple police cars … had been chasing respondent…. By contrast, those who might have been harmed had [the Officer] not taken the action he did were entirely innocent. We have little difficulty in concluding it was reasonable for Scott to take the action that he did.

Just moments before the shooting, Ms. Good had parked her vehicle across the lane of travel in which she was headed, creating a hazard for other vehicles on the roadway. Ms. Good was completely aware and uncaring about the hazards she was creating for others by her conduct.

She capped it off with a felonious aggravated assault with a deadly weapon against the Officer as she attempted to evade a lawful effort to detain her for her obstructive behavior.

Couldn’t the innocent public equally have been protected, and the tragic accident entirely avoided, if the police had simply ceased their pursuit? We think the police need not have taken that chance and hoped for the best. Whereas [the Officer’s] action … was certain to eliminate the risk that respondent posed to the public, ceasing pursuit was not. First of all, there would have been no way to convey convincingly to respondent that the chase was off, and that he was free to go…. [R]espondent might have been just as likely to respond by continuing to drive recklessly as by slowing down and wiping his brow.

Second, we are loath to lay down a rule requiring the police to allow fleeing suspects to get away whenever they drive so recklessly that they put other people’s lives in danger…. The Constitution assuredly does not impose this invitation to impunity-earned-by-recklessness. Instead, we lay down a more sensible rule: A police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.

One of the dumbest arguments being advanced in social media and elsewhere is the effort to distinguish between the ICE Officer’s first shot through the front windshield — presumably while he was still in front of the vehicle and at risk of being run into — and later shots that were fired by him through the driver’s side window after he was no longer immediately threatened.

Besides this being a 20-20 hindsight analysis that runs contrary to Graham v. Connor, it also ignores a more recent 9-0 decision by the Supreme Court involving the use of deadly force against the driver of a vehicle.

Plumhoff v. Rickart — 2014, with Justice Alito writing for a unanious court:

Following a car-stop of a suspected drunk driver, and after just a few questions posed by the officer, the driver sped away. The officer gave chase and was eventually joined by five other cars. The chase lasted more than 5 minutes, and at times exceeded 100 mph.

The chase eventually ended in a parking lot where the suspect’s car collided with a police vehicle, and other vehicles made an effort to pin in the suspect’s car in — the high speed chase portion was over. But that wasn’t the end of the suspect’s efforts to flee:

Now in danger of being cornered, Rickard put his car into reverse “in an attempt to escape.” As he did so, Evans and Plumhoff got out of their cruisers and … Evans, gun in hand, pounded on the passenger-side window…. Rickard’s tires started spinning, and his car “was rocking back and forth,” indicating that Rickard was using the accelerator even though his bumper was flush against a police cruiser. At that point, Plumhoff fired three shots into Rickard’s car. Rickard then “reversed in a 180 degree arc” and “maneuvered onto” another street, forcing Ellis to “step to his right to avoid the vehicle.” Ibid. As Rickard continued “fleeing down” that street, ibid., Gardner and Galtelli fired 12 shots toward Rickard’s car, bringing the total number of shots fired during this incident to 15. Rickard then lost control of the car and crashed into a building.

The comments I’ve seen on social media suggest there is case law that says each round fired must be independently justified as “reasonable.” They make this claim based on the premise that the shot fired through the front windshield must be evaluated separately from the shots fired though the passenger window, and if either are “unreasonable” then the ICE officer committed a crime. That’s just nonsense and I’d like to see anyone post in the comments a citation to a case saying that is the law.

Two issues relevant to the shooting of Ms. Good are addressed by Justice Alito in his opinion.

Under the circumstances at the moment when the shots were fired, all that a reasonable police officer could have concluded was that Rickard was intent on resuming his flight and that, if he was allowed to do so, he would once again pose a deadly threat for others on the road….

In light of the circumstances we have discussed, it is beyond serious dispute that Rickard’s flight posed a grave public safety risk, and here, as in Scott, the police acted reasonably in using deadly force to end that risk.

The fact that comments on X and legal beagle pundits want to claim that this poor woman in Minneapolis was not a real threat to the safety of anyone — based on their 20-20 hindsight — is best discounted and ignored on the basis that they weren’t standing in front of her car when she shifted into drive and pushed the accelerator. Had they been, they might have come away with a different impression of the threat she posed to the safety other others in the area had she been allowed to drive away.

On the issue of the multiple rounds fired by the ICE Officer:

We now consider respondent’s contention that, even if the use of deadly force was permissible, petitioners acted unreasonably in firing a total of 15 shots. We reject that argument. It stands to reason that, if police officers are justified in firing at a suspect in order to end a severe threat to public safety, the officers need not stop shooting until the threat has ended. As petitioners noted below, “if lethal force is justified, officers are taught to keep shooting until the threat is over.”

… This would be a different case if petitioners had initiated a second round of shots after an initial round had clearly incapacitated Rickard and had ended any threat of continued flight, or if Rickard had clearly given himself up. But that is not what happened.

The “threat” question isn’t limited to the threat Good posed to the ICE Officer himself. The question extends to the threat that Good represented to public safety. This renders meaningless all the arguments made based on the claim that she had passed him and he was no longer threatened by her car.

THAT IS NOT THE LAW. QUIT PAYING ATTENTION TO IDIOTS.

Barnes v. Felix — 2025.

Justice Kagan wrote for a unanimous Court, but the issues relevant to the Minneapolis shooting are addressed by Justice Kavaugh in a Concurring opinion in which three other Justices joined.

The issue addressed by Justice Kagan’s majority opinion was the Court’s rejection of a “refinement” of the “reasonableness” test for Fourth Amendment claims. The Fifth Circuit developed a “moment in time” approach it applied in cases involving the use of “deadly” force, compared to a less restrictive approach used in cases involving claims of “excessive” force when reaching a determination on the “reasonableness” of the Officer’s actions.

The “moment in time” analysis introduced a temporal element — what amount of time prior to the decision to use deadly force could be considered in an evaluation of the reasonableness of the decision? The “moment in time analysis directed the the district judge to identify the time period under the facts of the case relevant just to the decision to use deadly force, and then consider only the facts and circumstances within that time period in judging the reasonableness of the decision.

In the usual excessive-force case … the inquiry into reasonableness would involve considering a variety of circumstances. But when an officer has used deadly force, the [district] court continued, “the Fifth Circuit has developed a much narrower approach.” Then, a court could ask only about the situation existing “at the moment of the threat” that sparked the fatal shooting…. The District Court identified that moment as “the two seconds before Felix fired his first shot,” when he was standing on the doorsill of moving vehicle. At that moment, the court found, an officer could reasonably think himself “at risk of serious harm.” And under the Fifth Circuit’s rule, that fact alone concluded the analysis.

The Supreme Court reversed on the basis that the “moment in time” analysis was contrary to the Court’s established “totality of circumstances” test for determining “reasonableness,” a test that has no temporal limit.

That inquiry into the reasonableness of police force requires analyzing the “totality of the circumstances”.… [D]eciding whether a use of force was objectively reasonable demands “careful attention to the facts and circumstances” relating to the incident, as then known to the officer. For example, the “severity of the crime” prompting the stop can carry weight in the analysis. So too can actions the officer took during the stop, such as giving warnings or otherwise trying to control the encounter. And the stopped person’s conduct is always relevant because it indicates the nature and level of the threat he poses, either to the officer or to others.

[T]he “totality of the circumstances” inquiry into a use of force has no time limit. Of course, the situation at the precise time of the shooting will often be what matters most; it is, after all, the officer’s choice in that moment that is under review. But earlier facts and circumstances may bear on how a reasonable officer would have understood and responded to later ones.

In his concurring opinion, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett, Justice Kavanaugh observes some of the “circumstances” that arise in the context of a driver who evades a car-stop by driving away:

So even though most traffic stops end without incident, traffic stops are nonetheless inherently risky for police officers. And when, as in this case, the driver suddenly pulls away in the midst of a stop, the risks multiply. A driver speeding away from a traffic stop could easily endanger bystanders and other drivers … Moreover, the very “fact that a suspect flees when suspected of a minor offense,” such as speeding or a failure to pay tolls, “could well be indicative of a larger danger….” Fleeing from the traffic stop could suggest that the driver is preparing to commit or has committed a more serious crime—and is attempting to evade detection or arrest…. [A]s the tragic 2025 New Year’s terrorist attack in New Orleans illustrates, the driver might intend to use the car as a weapon.

The possibilities are many. But the key point is a commonsense one: A driver who speeds away from a traffic stop can pose significant dangers to both the officer and the surrounding community. The question when a driver flees, therefore, is not merely whether the underlying traffic violation “presents risks to public safety”—it is also “whether flight,” and what that flight might indicate or enable, “does so.”

The totality of circumstances relevant to the ICE Officer’s decision to use deadly force would have included not simply that Good was a “citizen protester” concerned about the removal policies of the Trump Administration, but also that she had created a dangerous condition for others in parking her vehicle blocking a lane of traffic, had failed to comply with lawful commands to exit her vehicle, failed to heed lawful commands to stop as he put the vehicle in gear and began to move, the directions coming from her partner to “drive” while the Officer was in front of her vehicle, his observations of her and her conduct through the front windshield, her turning the wheel into his direction and bringing the front end around to face him directly, and then beginning to accelerate with the car in “Drive.”

As noted in the Scott case quoted above, “We think the police need not have taken that chance and hoped for the best. Whereas [the Officer’s] action … was certain to eliminate the risk that respondent posed to the public, ceasing pursuit was not.”

In various posts on X I have commented extensively on the videos that have been made public. Not a single one leads me to doubt the reasonableness of the ICE Officer’s decision. There is not doubt that he was at physical risk of harm or death when Good reoriented her front end to face him while she reversed.

When she braked, stopped, shifted into Drive, and hit the accelerator, he REACTED immediately by removing his weapon — something he had not done to that point because he did not perceive a risk until she did that.

The nonesense about him walking in front of her vehicle ignores that she reoriented her vehicle’s front end in relationship to him when she turned the wheel one way while reversed, and the opposite way when starting forward.

It may have been a poor choice by the Officer to expose himself even to the extent of making that possible, but that does not inure to the benefit of her by claiming he was in the wrong. That idea only exists in the fevered dreams of lunatic lefty legal beagles and idiots on social media.

Many have mischaracterized the policy prohibition of walking in front of — or shooting into — a “moving vehicle.” Her vehicle as stationary, and the Officer had had already done a complete 360 walk around the vehicle while it was stationary and engaged with the driver.

He may have exposed himself unnecessarily to danger by walking back towards the front a second time, but he did not do so FOR THE PURPOSE of justifying the use of deadly force. The policy prohibits an officer from purposely stepping in front of a moving vehicle to create risk of injury in order to justify use of lethal force.

Same for the policy that prohibits shooting into a moving vehicle — the policy does NOT apply to use of lethal force in self-defense, it only applies to situations where the shooting is done for no purpose other than to prevent the driver from escaping.

These are POLICIES adopted by law enforcement agencies as “best practices.” An unjustified deviation or violation of the policy might subject the officer to discipline.

But they do not alter “lawful v. unlawful” and “constitutional v. unconstitutional” determinations.

These are the only images I needed to see to form my opinion.

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One ICE Officer is approaching her car and giving her lawful commands through her open driver’s side window. The car is in “Reverse” and her wheels are cut to the left. There is no ICE Officer to her front.

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Here she has moved approximately 3 feet back as you can see from the relationship of her tires to the white line in both images. The ICE Officer to her front is still visible. In this image her “Reverse” white tail lights are off — she has shifted into drive. Her front tires are still cut to the left, and her front end has reoriented more towards the Officer now in the center of her front end.

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This is as far backwards as she travels. Her brake lights are now off — she’s in “Drive” and her foot is no longer on the brake. The ICE Officer is now in front of her driver’s side headlight, and her wheels are facing straight ahead. At this moment her front wheels break traction as she attempts to accelerate forward. Had the tires not spun on the ice she would have made immediate and forceful contact.

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Just a fraction of a second later you see the ICE Officer drawing his firearm — her wheels are still straight. That’s the moment he decided to use deadly force — he recognized at that moment the fact that she was about to run him over. He resorted to deadly force in self-defense and defense of others.

That’s it.

As a federal prosecutor, if tasked to evaluate the lawfulness of his decision to use deadly force, I would have cleared him based on these four images and the video source alone. No other video produced so far does anything to call that conclusion into question.

What the driver’s intentions might have been are irrelevant. The one thing she clearly did not intend to do was to comply with the lawful orders she was given. As a result, she opened herself up to the consequences of the reasonable decision by the ICE Officer to eliminate the threat she posed to him as well as others.

• Policy push: Democrats in blue jurisdictions leverage Renee Good shooting to press for removal of federal immigration enforcement and end local deportations.
• Critique of enforcement: Some argue ICE’s broad dragnet and training deficiencies contribute to violent encounters and reckless behavior.
• Fact mismatch: Good, a citizen, was not targeted by ICE until she inserted herself into an operation, so her death did not stem from the deportation dragnet.
• Agent profile: The agent involved had ten years of ICE experience, served in an elite tactical unit, and had prior vehicle-stop incidents, undermining claims of inadequate training.
• ICE Watch tactic focus: Good participated in ICE Watch, a network that monitors ICE, alerts allies, and sometimes interferes with arrests, including blocking vehicles.
• Conflict intent: ICE Watch aims to disrupt deportations and provoke confrontations that garner attention and discredit enforcement efforts.
• Direct-action escalation: Constant appeals to direct action can encourage violence and personalized confrontations, potentially leading to extremism and plots.
• Responsibility question: Democrats should consider whether they support tactics that could cause violent confrontations, as such encouragement may shift blame to proponents.

D emocrats in Minnesota, Oregon, and other blue areas have leaped at the political opportunity presented by the ICE shooting of Renee Nicole Good to demand what they were already advocating all along: the complete removal of federal immigration enforcement from their jurisdictions, thus ensuring an end to deportations of illegal aliens in those places. Their argument is that the confrontation that led to Good’s death was an inevitable consequence of the Trump administration’s broad dragnet and aggressive street-level tactics in rounding up illegal aliens for deportation. More sophisticated critics, such as Jeremiah Johnson in The Dispatch, argue that Good’s death “was the inevitable outcome of an immigration enforcement apparatus that has been poorly trained, sheltered from consequences, and empowered to behave recklessly.”

With a different set of facts, these critiques might have some validity. Large-scale deportations require a lot of law-enforcement interactions with people who very much don’t want to be apprehended, some of them violent, others just desperate. That greatly increases the odds of violence (and is only a modest preview of what the left’s preferred gun-confiscation policies would look like). There are very fair policy debates over whether the benefits of such a broad deportation policy really outweigh the costs. And there are genuine and fair concerns that ICE, having staffed up very rapidly, has recruited too many sketchy people and trained them inadequately — concerns that don’t necessarily nullify the legitimacy of the mission of deporting a lot of people who are in the country illegally.

But none of those criticisms have anything to do with the death of Renee Nicole Good. They don’t fit the facts. And more importantly, they go out of their way to ignore the actual cause of her death, which is likely to produce more dangerous and possibly deadly encounters of this kind: the leftist strategy of direct-action protest.

Good’s death wasn’t the natural result of the deportation dragnet. She was a citizen, one who hadn’t even lived in Minneapolis that long, and there’s no reason to believe that ICE was investigating her as a possible deportee. There’s no sign that ICE was interested in her at all — until she inserted herself in their business. Nor was she some bystander caught in a crossfire between ICE agents and someone else they wanted to apprehend. So, there’s nothing in ICE’s strategy or tactics that put her inevitably in their crosshairs. She had to actively try to make herself a target for an ICE agent. That was her choice, not ICE’s.

Nor was her death the result of poor training by the current Department of Homeland Security. The agent who fired the shots had reportedly been with ICE for ten years and was assigned to an elite tactical unit. He was an experienced agent who had previous experience with vehicle stops, including one last year in which he was dragged by a vehicle. That doesn’t place his decisions above criticism, but it does suggest that those decisions were not the result of inexperience, hasty recruitment, or inadequate training within the past twelve months.

Now, consider why she was there. As Steven Vago, Chris Nesi and Natalie O’Neill of the New York Post reported, Good “was part of a group of activists who worked to ‘document and resist’ the federal immigration crackdown in Minnesota . . . Good became involved in ‘ICE Watch’ — a loose coalition of activists dedicated to disrupting ICE raids in the sanctuary city . . . Coalitions similar to ICE Watch have cropped up all over the country — with activists using phone apps, whistles and car horns to warn neighborhoods when ICE shows up. ICE Watch and adjacent groups can also turn confrontational — with numerous instances of activists ramming agents with their cars in the past.” 

As the Post report notes, “ICE agents have faced an unprecedented spike in car attacks, surging by some 3,200 percent over the last year, shocking data released by the Department of Homeland Security revealed to The Post.”

Our own Haley Strack has more in depth-reporting on ICE Watch:

ICE Watch chapters, which have cropped up in communities across the country in recent years, train activists to monitor ICE activity using purpose-built apps and alert allies who have been trained to flood an operation area and interfere with arrests being made. An Instagram account identified as “MN Ice Watch” instructs to report the locations and appearances of ICE agents. The account has posted photos across Minneapolis of law-enforcement agents, vehicle license plate numbers, and ICE officers’ faces; the account generates information via anonymous reports and submissions from local activists.

On a tab titled “Education,” the account promotes information about how to “de-arrest” individuals who have been arrested by law-enforcement by “physically removing an arrestee from a law enforcement officer’s grips, opening the door of a car or pressuring law enforcement officers to release an arrestee.” The “de-arrest primer” goes on to describe the benefits of blocking police vehicles. “If you don’t have a crowd asserting pressure there may be some interference charges that come with blocking a police vehicle that may be more easily handed down for only one or two people blocking a police vehicle, but in many cases these are misdemeanor offenses and catch and release,” the primer notes.

Read the whole thing; this is far beyond simply engaging in protest speech to bring attention to a political controversy or an injustice. It’s a campaign that aims at two ends, neither of which is mutually exclusive: thwarting the enforcement of laws passed by Congress, and/or provoking conflict and confrontation with armed federal agents in the hope of discrediting the enforcement of those laws. And ICE Watch chapters and similar organizations are doing this sort of thing all across the country. Good’s death is the inevitable, and to some extent intended, outcome of this style of direct action, which is designed to create headline-grabbing conflict and drama.

Direct action is a longstanding leftist protest approach, which predates the Trump era by decades. In its broadest definition, the term can simply mean staging a fairly passive conflict with an unjust law and demonstrating that injustice by provoking arrests — think of civil rights-era arrests of lunch-counter sit-ins. Progressives and liberals tend to think that all forms of direct action are harmless or beneficial because of this heritage. But the justice of the civil rights movement does not retroactively justify every tactic that was used in its cause, and not every tactic is equally virtuous.

The immediate risk of constant appeals to direct action is that it tends to encourage violence in the protesters. If you tell people to get in the faces of others, to bring a gun to a knife-fight, to give your political opponents no rest at home or at work, or otherwise to engage in direct, personal confrontations rather than simply appeal by speech to the general public, you will trigger in some of your audience a desire to go the next logical step. While that’s always a risk in high-octane political rhetoric, it’s a much more vibrant risk when you advocate not just a profound emotional animus but also a tactic of close, personalized confrontation.

This is how you get the assassinations, assassination attempts, and assassination plots against Donald Trump, Charlie Kirk, Brett Kavanaugh (and his fellow justices), and UnitedHealthcare CEO Brian Thompson, among others. It’s how you get senators chased into elevators and out of restaurants, protests at Supreme Court justices’ homes, speakers shouted off campuses, and all manner of volatile confrontations. It’s an approach specifically geared to create a climate of fear of physical violence in its targets, and to set both the protesters and the targets on the very edge of their last nerve. Even when we can justify this kind of thing in American history, from the Boston Tea Party to the Vigilance Committees that thwarted the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act, what we tend to see at the end of that road is revolution or civil war.

This is why the question of the day right now for every Democratic politician and commentator in this country should not be how much they hate ICE and its agents, or whether they want to see federal law nullified by disabling its enforcement. It should be whether they encourage ICE Watch and other similar tactics of creating potentially violent confrontations by protesters inserting themselves in the face of agents on duty to obstruct the enforcement of the law. Because if they do, the blood is on their hands, not ICE’s.

• Targeted Committees: MSS hacked email accounts used by staff on the House China, foreign affairs, intelligence, and armed services committees via Salt Typhoon.
• Detection Timeline: Intrusions were detected in December, though access to lawmakers’ personal emails remained unclear.
• Salt Typhoon Capabilities: Campaign enables access to unencrypted calls, texts, voicemails, and sometimes emails of nearly every American.
• Surveillance of Officials: Campaign has also intercepted senior US officials’ calls over the past years.
• Warnings of Vulnerability: Mark Warner highlighted the lack of encrypted devices and vulnerability of networks unless encryption used.
• Telecom Exposure: Jake Sullivan warned that US telecom firms remain highly vulnerable to Salt Typhoon.
• Additional Threats: Chinese state-sponsored Volt Typhoon has penetrated US energy, transportation, and communications networks.
• Sanctions and Denial: Treasury planned but reversed MSS sanctions over détente concerns, while the Chinese embassy denied accusations and labeled them disinformation.

China has hacked the emails used by congressional staff on powerful committees in the US House of Representatives, as part of a massive cyber espionage campaign known as Salt Typhoon.

Chinese intelligence accessed email systems used by some staffers on the House China committee in addition to aides on the foreign affairs committee, intelligence committee and armed services committee, according to people familiar with the attack. The intrusions were detected in December.

The attacks are the latest element of an ongoing cyber campaign against US communication networks by the Ministry of State Security, China’s intelligence service. One person familiar with the attack said it was unclear if the MSS had accessed lawmakers’ emails.

The MSS has been operating Salt Typhoon for several years. It allows China to access the unencrypted phone calls, texts and voicemails of almost every American, and in some cases enables access to email accounts.

Salt Typhoon has also intercepted the calls of senior US officials over the past couple of years, said people familiar with the campaign.

Mark Warner, the top Democrat on the Senate intelligence committee, in December said it was “baffling” that more attention was not being paid to Salt Typhoon. “Unless you’re on an encrypted device, they can pick any one of us,” Warner told the Defense Writers Group.

Jake Sullivan, former president Joe Biden’s national security adviser, told the Financial Times last year after leaving the White House that US telecom companies were “highly vulnerable” to Salt Typhoon.

The campaign is one of many cyber espionage efforts by Chinese intelligence and the People’s Liberation Army that target US infrastructure.

In 2024, the FBI and other US agencies said a Chinese state-sponsored hacking group that has been dubbed Volt Typhoon had penetrated US energy, transportation and communications systems in ways that would help China in the case of a conflict with America.

US telecom groups have done little to protect themselves from Salt Typhoon because of the huge cost involved in making networks resilient. Warner in December said US networks were particularly vulnerable because they were built when cyber security was not a serious concern.

The US Treasury planned to impose sanctions on MSS entities over Salt Typhoon in December, but it reversed course following concerns that it would derail the détente Presidents Donald Trump and Xi Jinping reached in October.

The four committees the MSS targeted declined to comment.

The Chinese embassy in the US denied the allegations about Salt Typhoon. Liu Pengyu, the embassy spokesperson, said: “We firmly oppose the US side making unfounded speculation and accusations, using cyber security to smear and slander China, and spreading all kinds of disinformation about the so-called Chinese hacking threats.”

• Veto alliance: President Karol Nawrocki, siding with U.S. President Donald Trump, rejected legislation to enforce the EU Digital Services Act in Poland.
• DSA opposition: The U.S. administration labels the EU law as censorship against conservatives, mirroring Nawrocki’s concerns about government overreach.
• Domestic clash: Nawrocki’s veto pits him against pro-EU Prime Minister Donald Tusk, whose parliamentary majority had passed the DSA law.
• Freedom warning: Nawrocki described granting authorities control over online speech as a step toward Orwellian censorship and urged independent courts instead.
• Government rebuttal: Deputy PM Krzysztof Gawkowski accused the president of undermining online safety and defended the bill’s reliance on courts.
• DSA enforcement gap: Poland now lacks national rules to enforce the DSA, with the EU pursuing infringement action and seeking a Digital Services Coordinator.
• International tensions: EU fines for X and investigations into AI-led content increase friction with Washington and spotlight DSA implementation.
• Political stalemate: Tusk’s coalition lacks votes to override the veto, deepening legislative gridlock ahead of elections while Nawrocki seeks to boost PiS prospects.

WARSAW — Poland's nationalist President Karol Nawrocki on Friday sided with his ally U.S. President Donald Trump to veto legislation on enforcing the EU's social media law, which is hated by the American administration.

Trump and his top MAGA officials condemn the EU's Digital Services Act — which seeks to force big platforms like Elon Musk's X, Facebook, Instagram to moderate content — as a form of “Orwellian" censorship against conservatives and right-wingers.

The presidential veto stops national regulators in Warsaw from implementing the DSA and sets Nawrocki up for a a clash with centrist pro-EU Prime Minister Donald Tusk. Tusk's parliamentary majority passed the legislation introducing the DSA in Poland.

Nawrocki argued that while the bill’s stated aim of protecting citizens — particularly minors — was legitimate, the Polish bill would grant excessive power to government officials over online content, resulting in “administrative censorship.” 

“I want this to be stated clearly: a situation in which what is allowed on the internet is decided by an official subordinate to the government resembles the construction of the Ministry of Truth from George Orwell’s novel 1984,” Nawrocki said in a statement — echoing the U.S.'s stance on the law.

Nawrocki also warned that allowing authorities to decide what constitutes truth or disinformation would erode freedom of expression “step by step.” He called for a revised draft that would protect children while ensuring that disputes over online speech are settled by independent courts.

Deputy Prime Minister and Digital Affairs Minister Krzysztof Gawkowski dismissed Nawrocki’s position, accusing the president of undermining online safety and siding with digital platforms. 

“The president has vetoed online safety,” Gawkowski told a press briefing Friday afternoon, arguing the law would have protected children from predators, families from disinformation and users from opaque algorithms. 

The minister also rejected Nawrocki’s Orwellian comparisons, saying the bill explicitly relied on ordinary courts rather than officials to rule on online content.

Gawkowski said Poland is now among the few EU countries without national legislation enabling effective enforcement of the DSA and pledged that the government would continue to pursue new rules.

The clash comes as enforcement of the social media law has become a flashpoint in EU-U.S. relations. 

Brussels has already fined Elon Musk’s X €120 million for breaching the law, prompting a furious response from Washington, including travel bans imposed by the Trump administration on former EU Commissioner Thierry Breton, an architect of the tech law, and four disinformation experts.

The DSA allows fines of up to 6 percent of a company’s global revenue and, as a measure of last resort, temporary bans on platforms.

Earlier this week, the European Commission expanded its investigation into X’s AI service Grok after it started posting a wave of non-consensual sexualized pictures of people in response to X users' requests.

The European Commission's digital spokesperson Thomas Regnier said the EU executive would not comment on national legislative procedures. "Implementing the DSA into national law is essential to allow users in Poland to benefit from the same DSA rights, such as challenging platforms if their content is deleted or their account suspended," he said.

"This is why we have an ongoing infringement procedure against Poland. We have referred Poland to the Court of Justice of the EU for failure to designate and empower the Digital Services Coordinator," in May 2025, Regnier added.

Gawkowski said that the government would make a quick decision on what to do next with the vetoed bill but declined to offer specifics on what a new bill would look like were it to be submitted to parliament again.

Tusk four-party coalition does not have enough votes in parliament to override Nawrocki’s vetoes. That has created a political deadlock over key legislation efforts by the government, which stands for reelection next year. Nawrocki, meanwhile, is aiming to help the Law and Justice (PiS) political party he’s aligned with to retake power after losing to Tusk in 2023.

Mathieu Pollet contributed reporting.

• Tether in Venezuela: Maduro boosted tether’s prominence so it now underpins oil settlements and civilian transactions by maintaining a one-to-one U.S. dollar peg.
• Tether persistence: Crypto analysts believe tether use will continue or grow despite Maduro’s arrest because hyperinflation and failing institutions keep demand high.
• Sanctions evasion link: Experts warn that governance failures enabling Russia-style sanctions evasion via stablecoins will remain until credible reforms arrive.
• US investigation aid: Tether’s financial connections in Venezuela position it to assist U.S. authorities in tracing funds alleged to have been stolen by the Maduro regime.
• Oil payments shift: In response to 2020 sanctions, PdVSA started demanding tether, settling exports through direct wallet transfers or intermediaries converting cash to the stablecoin.
• Stablecoin revenue: Local estimates indicate nearly 80% of Venezuela’s oil revenue is now collected in stablecoins such as tether, transforming the petroleum economy.
• Venezuelan daily use: Citizens use tether across everyday needs—from paying fees to buying haircuts—because the bolivar has collapsed and banks lack public trust.
• US policy context: The U.S. is selling blockaded Venezuelan oil with proceeds held in U.S.-controlled accounts, enabling selective sanction rollbacks while claiming benefits for the Venezuelan people.

By

Vicky Ge Huang

Updated Jan. 10, 2026 3:08 pm ET

134

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Shoppers at a store in Caracas, Venezuela. Carlos Becerra/Getty Images

• The arrest and removal of Nicolás Maduro is unlikely to diminish tether’s presence in Venezuela, where hyperinflation remains a problem, crypto analysts said.

• Tether’s financial ties to Venezuela put the cryptocurrency company in prime position to aid U.S. authorities seeking to track down what happened to funds allegedly stolen by the Maduro regime

• Faced with escalating U.S. sanctions in 2020, Venezuela’s state-run oil company began demanding payments in tether.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

• The arrest and removal of Nicolás Maduro is unlikely to diminish tether’s presence in Venezuela, where hyperinflation remains a problem, crypto analysts said.

  View more

Nicolás Maduro helped make tether the world’s dominant stablecoin. And with the former Venezuelan leader now sitting in a Brooklyn jail, the cryptocurrency’s central role in his nation’s economy is back in the spotlight.

Tether emerged as a vital tool for the state-run oil company to sidestep sanctions, serving as the currency for settling oil transactions. It also has offered a financial lifeline to everyday Venezuelans racked by the tumbling value of their home currency, the bolivar. Like most popular stablecoins, tether maintains a one-to-one peg to the U.S. dollar.

Maduro’s arrest and removal as Venezuela’s president is unlikely to diminish tether’s presence in Venezuela, where hyperinflation remains a problem, according to crypto analysts. Tether’s financial ties to Venezuela put the cryptocurrency company in prime position to aid U.S. authorities as they seek to track down what happened to funds allegedly stolen by the Maduro regime.

“Crypto use in Venezuela will persist and likely expand in the short term,” said Adam Zarazinski, chief executive officer of the crypto-intelligence firm Inca Digital. “For everyday users, it’s a coping mechanism for economic dysfunction and failing institutions. But those same governance failures also enable sanctions evasion, an outcome that won’t change without credible improvements in governance.”

Maduro pleaded not guilty to narcotrafficking charges during his arraignment this past week in U.S. federal court.

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The new phase comes as the cryptocurrency company Tether and its eponymous token, once maligned as the stablecoin choice of outlaws, seek to gain acceptance in the U.S. Last year legislation was passed that paved the way for greater use of stablecoins, and Tether has announced plans to issue a stablecoin available to U.S. investors. Doing so would put the company on equal footing with such rivals as Circle Internet Group and Paxos. Without such a move, Tether risks being sidelined in the U.S. market.

This past week Energy Secretary Chris Wright said the U.S. would sell blockaded Venezuelan oil indefinitely. Proceeds from the sales, Wright said, would be deposited into accounts controlled by the U.S. government and eventually moved to the Latin American country to “benefit the Venezuelan people.” A senior Trump administration official told The Wall Street Journal that the government was selectively rolling back sanctions to enable the transport and sale of crude oil and oil products to the global market.

Faced with escalating U.S. sanctions in 2020, Venezuela’s state-run oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela, or PdVSA, began demanding payments in tether to bypass the traditional banking system. Oil-export payments were settled through direct tether transfers to a certain wallet address or through intermediaries swapping cash proceeds for tether.

The shift was transformative for the country’s oil economy. By one estimate, almost 80% of Venezuela’s oil revenue is collected in stablecoins like tether, a local economist, Asdrúbal Oliveros, said on a recent podcast. 

Tether has since cooperated with U.S. authorities to freeze dozens of wallets identified as being involved in the Venezuelan oil trade. Spokespeople for Tether didn’t respond to requests for comment.

Not long after the sanctions took effect, tether, whose ticker is USDT, became a viable alternative currency to many Venezuelans, who used the stablecoin to send money across borders, secure savings and pay for daily transactions.

“The Venezuelan bolivar lost 99.8% in the last 10 years against the U.S. dollar, the Turkish lira lost 80%, the Argentina peso around 94.5%,” said Tether CEO Paolo Ardoino at a recent crypto conference. “That is, in one simple chart, the reason why USDT is successful.”

Mauricio Di Bartolomeo, a crypto entrepreneur born and raised in Venezuela, said his 71-year-old aunt called him two months ago because she needed to get tether to pay for the homeowners-association fees for her condo.

“It’s how you pay your landscaper and how you pay for your haircut. You can use tether basically for anything,” said Di Bartolomeo, the co-founder of the crypto lender Ledn. “Stablecoin adoption has gone so far into Venezuela that even without having regulated venues where you can buy and sell them, people still choose to go for stablecoins as opposed to using the local banks.”

SHARE YOUR THOUGHTS

Do you think Tether will gain acceptance in the U.S. despite its history as a tool to sidestep sanctions? Join the conversation below.

Researchers said tether’s role in Venezuela is inevitable owing to the people’s lack of trust in the domestic banking system and strict capital controls that limit access to physical dollars. A case in point: The Venezuelan government’s attempt to introduce an oil-backed cryptocurrency called Petro in 2018 failed because of a lack of public trust and international acceptance. 

“The issue isn’t tether itself, but the dual-use reality of stablecoins,” said Ari Redbord, global head of policy at TRM Labs, which has a partnership with Tether to track illicit activity involving the use of the stablecoin on the Tron blockchain. “They can be a civilian lifeline and, under sanctions pressure, a tool for evasion.”

Write to Vicky Ge Huang at vicky.huang@wsj.com

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