- US intervention: Early on January 3, U.S. forces seized Nicolás Maduro and his wife in Caracas, flew them to New York to face federal drug and weapons charges, and President Trump vowed further action and indefinite U.S. control if necessary.
- Regime continuity: Maduro’s governmental structure, security forces, and the military remain intact with Delcy Rodríguez as acting president, making the current collapse resemble a leadership decapitation rather than regime change.
- Rodríguez and oil leverage: Trump appears willing to work with Rodríguez, who may consent to U.S. control of Venezuela’s oil industry in exchange for cooperation, suggesting the United States could run Venezuelan oil assets without full regime replacement.
- Invasion risks: A land invasion might be militarily feasible, but occupying Venezuela poses challenges given its terrain, population, and paramilitary groups, raising the specter of guerrilla warfare or civil conflict.
- Venezuelan sentiment: While many Venezuelans celebrated Maduro’s removal, the regime still retains loyalists, and the population, exhausted by economic collapse and mass migration, yearns for stability.
- Democracy prospects: Economic recovery backed by U.S. support could win any incumbent elections, but genuine democratic turnover depends on institutions allowing peaceful power shifts rather than contingent alliances with Washington.
- Opposition constraints: María Corina Machado lacks insurgent forces and U.S. backing now that Trump favors Rodríguez, leaving opposition figures limited to constitutional advocacy and waits for future elections.
- International reaction: Responses split along ideological lines, with some center-right voices supportive and center-left or leftist governments warning that the intervention breaches self-determination, while others stay diplomatically cautious to avoid U.S. retaliation.
Early in the morning of January 3, U.S. forces struck Caracas, seized Venezuelan President Nicholás Maduro and his wife, and flew them out of the country. The extraction operation caps off months of military pressure by the United States against Maduro’s regime. Maduro will be detained in New York City, where he faces federal drug and weapons charges. In a press conference Saturday, U.S. President Donald Trump said he is willing to attack Venezuela again and that Washington would indefinitely “run the country.”
For insight into what this means for Venezuela, the United States, and the region, Foreign Affairs spoke with Francisco Rodríguez, who served as the head of the Economic and Financial Advisory of the Venezuelan National Assembly from 2000 to 2004. Rodríguez also served as Head of the Research Team of the United Nations’ Human Development Report Office from 2008 to 2011 and as Chief Andean Economist at Bank of America from 2011 to 2016. He is the author of three books on Venezuela and is now a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Economic and Policy Research and a professor at the University of Denver. Rodríguez spoke with Senior Editor Daniel Block on Saturday afternoon. The conversation has been edited for length and clarity.
What is the current political situation in Venezuela?
The structure of the Venezuelan government that was set up by Maduro is still in power. His regime still controls the military. It controls the security forces. His vice president, Delcy Rodríguez, has succeeded him in office. What has happened, in other words, is very similar to what happens when there’s an assassination of a political leader. You take out the head, but the structure continues to be in control.
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Now, whether this structure lasts is uncertain. In his press conference on Saturday, Trump effectively signaled that he will carry out another military operation if Rodríguez doesn't collaborate with the United States. Trump wants Washington to run the country, so my guess is that he sets up some kind of team to exercise influence over Venezuela and asks the Venezuelan government to meet their various demands.
Can the Venezuelan government really accept that kind of arrangement?
There will certainly be a section of the government that says, "We’re going to resist.” But the United States has proven that its military threats are credible. And Trump’s demands might actually be more tolerable to Rodríguez than they initially appear. When he says that Washington is going “to run the country,” he is likely talking most about getting U.S. companies back in and having the United States take control of Venezuela’s oil. Rodríguez could deliver on that. In fact, Maduro tried to make such an agreement in 2025. He made an overture to Trump where he effectively said, "You can have whatever you want in terms of our oil industry."
Trump, of course, didn’t accept that from Maduro. Why might he be willing to work with Rodríguez on a similar arrangement?
Maduro had become utterly toxic—the embodiment of an evil dictator. What Trump seems to be saying now is that he’s willing to do this with a post-Maduro government, even if it’s led by Maduro’s own people. I found it interesting that the United States had such an easy time capturing Maduro and his wife while they slept. That strongly suggests that there was some type of internal collaboration from the Venezuelan forces that were guarding him. It doesn’t mean that the whole regime betrayed Maduro. But it does suggest this could have been something of a palace coup. [Secretary of State] Marco Rubio is already having conversations with Rodríguez, and Trump said that he thinks Rodríguez is ready to do what it takes to, in Trump’s words, “make Venezuela great again.” And surprisingly, Trump said that María Corina Machado—the opposition leader who was behind Maduro’s electoral defeat last year—doesn’t have the respect necessary to lead the country. So Trump seems to think he can work with Venezuela’s current government to meet U.S. demands in terms of oil security and national security.
That said, the regime might not be willing to meet Trump’s demands. There are other government officials who could push against any kind of accommodation. In that case, Trump might decide he has no choice but to increase the pressure with more military strikes and, ultimately, a land invasion. Trump has clearly invested a lot in this operation, and he’s now claiming it’s a huge success. It’s hard to see the president backing down if he doesn’t get control of the oil industry. I think that no matter what, we’re going to get a scenario in which American companies are going to be running the Venezuelan oil industry as if it were a United States protectorate.
Let’s say that’s what happens: Caracas continues to resist and there is an invasion. What do you think would happen?
I think that what we saw this weekend indicates that a land invasion of Venezuela might not be that difficult for the United States, militarily speaking. The Venezuelan armed forces didn’t prove capable of resisting or creating any real danger to U.S. forces. But that doesn’t mean that occupying the country is going to be easy. Venezuela has a large landmass, a large population, and many active paramilitary and criminal groups. It’s a place that could easily fall into anarchy. You can imagine a world where Washington takes down the state, only for elements of the Venezuelan army to form a guerrilla movement together with some of the Colombian guerrilla groups already active in the country. You could easily end up with a civil war–type situation.
How do you think Venezuelans feel about Washington’s operations?
First, I don’t think that the United States going into another country and kidnapping its leader, however evil that leader may be, is a good outcome. I don’t think that's a good policy strategy. It undermines some of the basic rules that govern relations between countries and therefore makes the world more dangerous.
That said, Venezuelans disliked Maduro, and most of them are probably happy to see him go. We’ve already seen some spontaneous signs of people celebrating his ouster. Now, the situation is very tense because, yes, Maduro is out, but his regime is still in power, and it’s important to remember that Maduro has loyal supporters. But Venezuelans have gone through a horrible crisis. The country has lost nearly three-quarters of its GDP. Eight million Venezuelans have fled. So I think that the majority of Venezuelans are tired and want a way out, and an overwhelming majority are going to welcome the closing of this chapter.
Is it possible that Venezuela could transition to democracy?
That depends on what we mean by democracy. I have no doubt that any government that oversees an economic recovery could win Venezuelan elections. And there’s a world in which Venezuela now gets such a recovery. If the state gets oil production back up, which is possible with U.S. support and the lifting of sanctions, Venezuela could experience high, double-digit growth for several years. My estimates, which coincide with those of other economists, including those who work for Machado, is that Venezuela could see its GDP per capita in U.S. dollars triple in the next decade. So if the Venezuelan government strikes a deal with the United States that lifts sanctions and where billions of dollars go into recovering the Venezuelan oil industry, whatever government is in power could comfortably win free elections.
But that doesn’t mean Venezuela would then be a genuine democracy. It’s easy for governments to hold elections if they know they’re going to win because the economy is doing well. True democracy requires a situation where elections are not held merely when it’s convenient for incumbents—and that’s a higher bar. It means a system of government where power can and does transfer between opposing parties in response to the will of the citizens. And I am not optimistic that we will get that. Instead, we will probably get a situation where the government, whether it’s headed by Rodríguez or Machado or some other figure, is essentially subservient to the United States. We will have the United States, through military might, determining who is in charge.
Let’s talk about Venezuela’s opposition. Various opposition leaders asked for the United States to intervene. Now, it has. But as you noted earlier, Trump said he doesn’t think that Machado has the respect needed to lead. What options do she and her movement have?
Machado was really dependent on the United States. She did not have the support of an insurrectionist force or rebel fighters that were ready to take power. She had the support of the majority of Venezuelans, but that support was, more than anything else, opposition to Maduro. What she had was Washington, and Trump has pulled the rug from under her.
Now, Machado and the opposition can try to prepare for when Venezuela next has elections. But that could take a long time, because again, Trump was not talking about elections. He was talking about the United States running the country until it’s stabilized. So aside from continuing to advocate for the Venezuelan constitution to be respected and for the result of the elections to be honored or to have new elections and compete in them, Machado and the opposition don’t have many options.
How do you think the other countries are going to react to Washington’s actions?
We’ve seen some statements, and along predictable ideological lines. We have seen some expressions of support from center-right and right-wing leaders. We’ve seen obviously strong condemnation from leftist governments like that of Cuba. But we’ve also seen center-left governments condemn U.S. actions, such as Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and outgoing Chilean President Gabriel Boric- even though Boric has been a Maduro critic. This attack cuts so strongly against the basic idea of self-determination that I think it’s going to spark a significant amount of rejection.
Now, that said, leaders in the region and around the world know they know that they have to be careful about not antagonizing Trump. They’re trying to solve their own problems, including their own bilateral problems with the United States. They know that if you get on Trump’s bad side, Washington might decide that it’s going to impose tariffs on you or not cut that trade deal on which you were working. So we're also going to get some responses like what we’ve gotten from the European Union and some European governments this morning, which are muted and couched in diplomatic language.
What do you think the United States should do going forward to help Venezuela, now that Maduro is gone? Is there any reason to be optimistic?
There is an element of prudence in Trump saying that the opposition cannot currently run the country. Machado and her allies have advocated for imprisoning almost all of the Venezuelan military and political leadership. So I think if Trump were to simply install Machado, the risk would be ungovernability and chaos. It could also be a pathway to civil war, as ousted current military officers fight back against the government rather than risk going to prison.
Instead, and as I argued in my Foreign Affairs piece, what the United States should do is foster some type of agreement between the new leader [Rodríguez] and the opposition that results in a power-sharing agreement, where they build institutions for coexistence. Trump suggested during his press conference that there would need to be a period of time before there could be a proper transition. And I think there’s a kernel of truth to this, which is that holding new elections too soon may create more problems than it solves. If Rodríguez and the U.S. government use the upcoming months to build systems that regulate competition and protect those who lose elections, that would be a much more solid basis for a durable democratic transition in Venezuela.
But this kind of positive outcome very rarely happens as a result of military action. External state building usually results in instability. And Trump seems to be framing this attack not around democracy, but around oil. That is a serious mistake. Demanding that Venezuela hand over its oil resources to the United States is going to generate huge levels of animosity in Venezuelan society. It could even leave Venezuela’s opposition really disaffected—particularly if Washington partners with Rodríguez and doesn’t press for any political reforms within the country. The opposition hoped to drive Venezuela’s autocrats from power and gain freedom and autonomy for the Venezuelan people. Now, they might end up with a system where Maduro’s regime is still in control, and it’s struck an oil deal with the United States. It is the antithesis of what they wanted.














