• The Trump administration's coalition includes both MAGA populism and DOGE libertarianism, with figures like Steve Bannon and Elon Musk representing their respective factions.
• MAGA rejects neoliberal globalism, prioritizing national interests, while DOGE advocates for deregulation, economic liberty, and technological optimism.
• Despite apparent divisions, the coalition remains intact due to shared opposition to progressive authoritarianism and overlapping policy goals.
• Vice President J.D. Vance has worked to bridge the gap between MAGA and DOGE, emphasizing their compatibility in speeches on AI, free speech, and economic policy.
• The coalition is likely to endure, as both factions benefit from a common enemy and Vance's efforts to unify their visions.

As we begin approach the 100^th day of the second Trump administration, the apparent division between MAGA populism and DOGE libertarianism remains one of the major stories of this new era. The MAGA firebrand Steve Bannon and the DOGE impresario Elon Musk are the public faces of this divide. Bannon, in particular, has been vocal in his denunciations of DOGE as a fundamental betrayal of basic commitments of MAGA populism, describing Musk as “evil”, an “oligarch”, and a “parasitic illegal immigrant”.

Yet as Musk is reportedly being ushered out of the administration, there is reason to be sceptical of overheated reports of a fundamental rupture.

Points of divergence are obvious, to be sure. MAGA represents a repudiation of older neoliberal orthodoxy, the article of faith once held by the mainstream of the Republican Party and the triangulated centre-left of the Clinton-Blair and Obama years. Capturing the GOP through the gravitational force of Donald Trump, MAGA rejected the imagined globalist free-market paradise in which products and workers flowed freely in a borderless, flattened world. Dreams of a liberal international order led by US and European elites have been shattered as old allies now regard each other with deepening mistrust. Deportations, tariffs, and a focus on regional hegemony have become the centrepiece of a robustly America First reorientation.

DOGE, by contrast, appears to be a reconstitution of a longstanding libertarian agenda. While MAGA emphasises the need for a powerful government acting forcefully on behalf of its citizens, DOGE has revived Reagan-era commitments to downsize and outright eliminate vast swaths of the federal government. It promotes an agenda of deregulation and economic and individual liberty. Its commitment to a more porous economic landscape is now muted, but not forgotten.

The techno-libertarians preference for open borders (at least, for some classes of newcomers) has been silenced for the moment by the furious MAGA response to then-DOGE co-director Vivek Ramaswami’s efforts to increase the number of H1B visas for engineers from Asia. Musk’s dreams of colonising Mars likewise reflect DOGE’s deepest commitments not just to a borderless world, but a borderless humanity, as does his most recent claims on X that biological humanity is a “boot-loader” for “digital super-intelligence”.

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Yet stories about the divide, mainly from journalists in mainstream newspapers and journals, increasingly seem to be born of a lack of political acumen and an excess of wishful thinking. A yearning for a crack-up and attendant dysfunction has blinded many political observers to the more complicated reality of coalition politics. American politics invariably gives rise to political coalitions that are always to some degree internally incoherent.

However, philosophical incoherence does not equal governing inability or paralysis. The success of all political coalitions depends in equal parts on deeply shared animus against a common enemy, on the one hand, and overlapping consensus in some key areas, on the other. If those two main conditions persist, then a successful political agenda, even amid a degree of constrained internal conflict and compromise, is not only possible, but likely.

This was true during the Reagan administration — when pro-business libertarians, Cold War Hawks, and social conservatives were able to maintain a working coalition; and it was true during the two terms of Obama, when the woke “identitarians”, the old labour Left, and neoliberal technocrats were able to maintain an esprit de corps.

Like those two administrations, the Trump coalition enjoys a common enemy and an overlapping consensus. For that reason, the MAGA-DOGE coalition will persist in relative comity at least until the start of the next campaign cycle, which begins in fewer than two years. Even after that point, MAGA-DOGE will be the working coalition to which presumptive 2028 Republican candidate, Vice President J.D. Vance, will seek to appeal and ride to victory.

Indeed, there is no better figure than Vance to provide a window into the reasons why this coalition is not in the midst of fracturing. Not only has Vance studied with seriousness their respective intellectual sources, but as a matter of deeply personal biography, he understands himself as a cohesive combination of those two intellectual and political streams. In three notable speeches, Vance has already begun to lay out his vision for both his own and America’s political future, one which is notably attentive to rendering the apparent contradictory MAGA-DOGE coalition into a complementary whole.

The first speech was delivered on 11 February, 2025, at the Artificial Intelligence Action Summit in Paris. The second speech — arguably his most impactful to date — was delivered three days later at the Munich Security Conference. The third speech was delivered on 18 March at the American Dynamism Conference. All three spoke at least implicitly about the relationship of the two parts of the Trump-Vance coalition, with the latter of the two offering the most explicit effort to date to synthesise the two seeming opposites.

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The first of these speeches appeared to be the most “DOGE”-friendly, with Vance chiding Europeans especially for their eagerness to place peremptory limitations on AI developments. He lauded recent advances in AI, offering a firmly “techno-optimist ”spin characteristic of the DOGE worldview. In his encouragement of a “deregulatory flavour”, the influence of the likes of his benefactor Peter Thiel is evident, particularly in Thiel’s expressed concern for the ways that fears of apocalypse have thwarted innovation and led to an era of technological stagnation.

However, in other respects, even in his most DOGE-friendly speech to date, Vance simultaneously emphasised how AI developments stand to benefit those of a MAGA persuasion. Several times, Vance nodde to the common enemy of both DOGE and MAGA, the weakened Leviathan of woke progressive authoritarianism. Highlighting their shared animus, Vance insisted before his largely European audience that AI should “remain free of ideological bias” and be deployed in ways that avoid being co-opted as a “tool of authoritarian censorship”.

But his most MAGA-inflected point was to underscore AI’s potential to generate new jobs in a plethora of industries. Vance rejected a common fear of MAGA technophobes (such as that expressed in Tucker Carlson’s support for at least a temporary ban on driverless trucks), stating that “AI, I really believe, will facilitate and make people more productive. It is not going to replace human beings. It will never replace human beings”.

He expressed his excitement over the ways that AI development was “grounded in the real and the physical economy”, emphasising the hands-on work of doctors, manufacturers, and soldiers. To further the appeal to MAGA denizens, he emphasised current US leadership in this technological space, one that translates into benefits for American national security. Foreshadowing his other major speeches early in his term as vice president, Vance constantly emphasises how MAGA ends and DOGE ends share considerable overlap.

The widely discussed Munich Security speech again had elements intended to reflect, and appeal to, both elements of the Trump-Vance coalition. Again, the “common enemy” was identified: the oppressive regime of progressive speech and idea regulation. Vance called out European liberal elites for their promiscuous use of government power to suppress disfavoured views and even disqualify candidates and entire political parties from electoral consideration.

The “free-speech” dimension of Vance’s remarks reflected the libertarian commitments of the DOGE constituency, while the clear efforts to liberate “Make Europe Great Again” views from legal and political constraint are the necessary precursor to populist electoral success. In effect, Vance was signaling that (in this case) DOGE means are necessary for MEGA ends. Only a more libertarian approach to speech and political expression would clear a path to a comparable populist movement in Europe, one emphasising the need for secure borders, a producer economy, and greater military realism.

These themes were reiterated in a more recent speech by Vance, this time in Washington at a summit organised by Silicon Valley disruptors such as Marc Andreessen. At that event, Vance confronted head-on the dominant narrative of a divide between “techno-optimists” and the “populist Right” of the Trump coalition, declaring that he rejected the idea of an unbridgeable divide between the two as a “proud member of both tribes”. Vance echoed themes from his Paris speech, emphasising not only the desirability and even inescapability of innovation, but praising its potential to benefit workers — even citing Saint John Paul II — according to their work lives ever greater dignity.

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But in a speech before a Silicon Valley audience, Vance underscored a main MAGA point: “deindustrialisation poses risks both to our national security and to our workforce”. While acknowledging the potential loss of meaning that technological disruption of older industries poses to the industrial workforce, Vance emphasised a point intended to win over both MAGA and DOGE constituencies: globalisation’s “hunger for cheap labour” has been bad both for American workers and bad for innovation.

Strengthening the American manufacturing sector, he noted, would have the benefit of reintegrating what globalism has separated: design from manufacturing, engineers from assembly, thinkers from doers. Indeed, speaking in quasi-Marxian language of the dangers of “alienation”, Vance in fact articulated a view that could be easily shared by the most pro-union factory worker and the most libertarian technologist: work and products improve with integration.

An oft-repeated theme in Walter Isaacson’s biography of Elon Musk is how the Tesla and SpaceX boss rejected the Steve Jobs model of “designing” in Cupertino and producing in China. Instead, in every one of his manifold endeavors, Musk has sought to bring into close proximity the engineers and the fabricators, believing with considerable evidence that their separation leads to the inability of each to learn from the limitations and insights of the other. Rather than discerning a DOGE-versus-MAGA narrative, Vance stresses how the aims of each align, even as they seek to defeat a common enemy.

More clearly and consistently than anyone in this not-yet-100-day-old administration, Vance loses no opportunity to articulate the basic alignment of DOGE and MAGA. As with any coalition, there are and will continue to be tensions (as Vivek discovered). Vance may yet be proved wrong that technologies such as AI will prove beneficial not only to workers, but to humanity at large (I, for one, hope that humanity is not the “biological boot-loader for digital superintelligence”).

But Vance is not only intellectually and biographically, but politically as well, the “child” of DOGE and MAGA. Like any child, he aims to articulate the virtues and compatibility of his parents. Those who believe, or hope, that the coalition is on the verge of dysfunctional collapse may be surprised by how durable it is — and will remain under a successor administration.

• Regimes end in phases: Trump's tariffs mark a "Gorbachev moment" for globalization, similar to how communism declined over a decade.
• Tariffs will initially raise US revenue and spur industrial relocation, with long-term effects outweighing short-term economic disruptions.
• Trump's tariff strategy will likely succeed in reshoring manufacturing but risks recession if tax policies falter and budget deficits persist.
• The EU lacks effective retaliation options—its trade surplus, reliance on US goods, and internal barriers limit meaningful countermeasures.
• Europe faces a dilemma: collaborating with China risks trade wars, while resisting US tariffs weakens its economic and geopolitical stance.

When regimes end, they end in phases. Communism died over a period of 10 years, starting with the strike at the Gdansk shipyard in 1980. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was the great symbolic episode, and the 1991 coup against Mikhail Gorbachev was the final push. Yesterday was globalisation’s Gorbachev moment. Trump’s first term was Gdansk, the canary in the coal mine.

On Liberation Day, international macroeconomists were busy digging out the Project Fear models with which they spectacularly misdiagnosed the economic consequences of both Brexit and the sanctions against Russia. But, really, tariffs are better viewed in terms of longer cycles, as is the case in politics. In the very short run, they constitute a price and output shock, with some characteristics of the economic impact of Covid. The tariffs will raise substantial revenues for the US government this year and next, with industrial relocation playing a progressively more important role in the following two years.

When Tesla invested in Germany, there were two years between the announcement and the actual beginning of production. But the initial announcement was preceded by a year of evaluation and negotiations. Companies with existing plants are best placed to expand production quickly. Taking stock after three or four years is the preferable way to judge this, and the obsession with year-one effects is the reason why people are misjudging trade-related policy decisions.

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Will Trump get what he wants? In terms of reshoring manufacturing, the answer is probably yes. For the largest trading partners, such as China and Germany, this will be a massive shock because of what it implies for the sustainability of the current economic models. Contrary to predictions, there has not been a compensating dollar revaluation, which open macro models would predict as a market response to tariffs. The unwinding of the globalisation Ponzi scheme, which brought increasing capital flows into the US markets, is now clearly the bigger factor.

Politically, these tariffs will work for Trump. Foreign manufacturers are already declaring that they will step up investments in the US. The old manufacturing jobs won’t come back, but new ones will be created. There is, though, a serious risk of a US recession this year if Trump fails to get his tax policies through Congress. The Republicans may lose the midterm elections. But if the goal is to raise external revenues, reduce the budget deficit, and reshore manufacturing, those tariffs will work — so long as one remembers that they cannot do everything at the same time.

Europeans in particular should be wary of wishful thinking. There were plenty of gleeful projections of a more severe impact for the US than for Europe. In the short term, there will be a negative effect on the American economy, as the tariffs are a huge tax on US consumers. 

It’s a struggle, though, to see what the EU can do in return. The bloc ran a trade surplus of $230 billion last year and the current account surplus against the rest of the world is rising again, back towards the pre-Covid levels, when the euro area adjusted to the sovereign debt crisis by depressing consumption and investment. This is the unsustainable element of the post-Cold War international economic model, along with China’s financial repression. The EU could promise to import more US defence goods, but this would run counter to its strategy of making itself more independent from the US, which should be a more important strategic goal than tariff-avoidance. Nor can the EU simply decide to not buy more LNG from the US. In any case, even if the EU were to make such a promise, the tariffs would only be lifted afterwards.

The EU could decide to reduce its own tariffs, remove quotas, and non-tariff barriers. One example of a non-tariff barrier is the lack of a German motorway speed limit. This necessitates a disproportionately high safety standard for cars — a protectionist measure designed to protect the European car industry from imports of cars that cost half as much elsewhere. If the EU were to reduce the direct and indirect tariffs and the quotas on US agricultural products, then we could see a pathway for negotiations. But the US is not going to lift its tariffs in anticipation of future EU action. Those times are over.

What, though, if the EU were to impose a tariff on US services? This is the closest the bloc has to a bazooka — it has a services deficit with the US of roughly half the size as its goods surplus. But a tariff on services is difficult because suppliers can easily evade them, by relocating out of the EU and citizens would push back since there are often no alternatives.

In any case, one of the reasons it would be unwise to predict the economic consequences of yesterday’s decision is that so much depends on how others react. China, for example, could respond by diverting trade to the EU, and we could end up with a EU-China trade war. Ursula von der Leyen has already ominously said:  “We will also be watching closely what indirect effects these tariffs could have, because we cannot absorb global overcapacity nor will we accept dumping on our market.”

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So rather than co-ordinating our retaliation against the US along with those east Asian countries most seriously hit by the tariffs, such as China, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Vietnam, we will probably go away and fight our own separate trade wars, allowing America to play us off against each other.

If, though, we were to co-operate and attempt to find an alternative to the US financial architecture, security guarantees or the dollar, that would be a genuine problem for Trump. But it’s doubtful that will happen. Instead, the EU finds itself in a position where it is fighting trade wars against two of its main trading partners: retaliating against the US — which will inevitably backfire — while also trying to stem Chinese imports.

The EU tariffs on China are, of course, quite different in intention, form, and content from the US ones. But the net effect is a worsening diplomatic relationship with China, and an irreconcilable trade balance. And, so, Europe finds itself between a rock and a hard place. China, and the other countries hit hard by these tariffs, are both necessary partners in organising a response, and a threat to European industry. Unless a degree of rebalancing is accepted — losing the trade battle to win the trade war — it’s hard to see a way out. 

• U.S. tech companies risk losing access to the European market due to their alignment with the Trump administration, which is increasingly hostile toward the EU.
• Europe is reevaluating its reliance on U.S. tech platforms, seeing them as both a competitiveness issue and a strategic vulnerability.
• Legal challenges in Europe, particularly over data privacy, could sever transatlantic data flows, disrupting business models of companies like Meta, Google, and Microsoft.
• European efforts to build alternative tech infrastructure could lead to a fragmented global internet, reducing U.S. influence and profits.
• Tech leaders' close ties to Trump have undermined trust in Europe, accelerating calls for regulatory and technological independence from U.S. firms.

Technology companies such as Alphabet, Meta, and OpenAI need to wake up to an unpleasant reality. By getting close to U.S. President Donald Trump, they risk losing access to one of their biggest markets: Europe.

Just a decade ago, these companies believed that information technology would limit the power of governments and liberalize the world. But then, as globalization withered and the U.S. confrontation with China took hold, they tried to take advantage of growing geopolitical divides, enlisting on Washington’s side in the new technological cold war. Now, the new Trump administration appears less enthusiastic about fighting China than it is about subjugating U.S. allies in the European Union and elsewhere. U.S. tech companies extract billions of dollars in profits from European markets. Although many of these tech companies would love to take the EU regulatory state down a peg, they don’t want to get caught in the crossfire of an all-out EU-U.S. tech war.

Unfortunately for Big Tech, such a war may be about to erupt. The Trump administration’s evident contempt for Europe may not only endanger the business interests of European companies. It could also spell the end of today’s open Internet, as Europeans look to build alternative platforms to those of the giant U.S. tech firms.

Silicon Valley’s efforts to cater to the Trump administration threaten to undermine Big Tech’s business model across much of the world. As tech executives have embraced the new U.S. government, they have increasingly embroiled themselves in the brewing conflict between European regulators in Brussels and an executive in Washington acting with striking unilateralism. As a result, Europeans are starting to take a second look at their reliance on U.S. cloud, platform, and satellite providers. They increasingly see such dependency not just as a competitiveness issue but also as a critical strategic vulnerability that could be exploited against them. Most worrying for U.S. tech companies is that even if European politicians are reluctant to act, European judges, regulators, and activists may act in their stead and push to sever data flows between the United States and Europe.

This is not the first time that a rift has opened between the United States and Europe on technology. A decade ago, the National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden revealed that the United States had been spying on European leaders, revelations that provoked EU threats to limit flows of personal data to the United States. Brad Smith, Microsoft’s president, explained in a 2019 book that the uproar around Snowden’s disclosures had created a lasting “chasm between governments and the tech sector.” When the European Court of Justice ruled in 2015 against an arrangement that allowed data on EU citizens to be sent to the United States, Eric Schmidt, then the executive chairman of Alphabet, lamented that the EU might break the global Internet, “one of the greatest achievements of humanity.”

The global Internet will likely continue to exist in the form of shared technical infrastructure. But if U.S. companies persist in identifying with a U.S. administration that is hostile to Europe, it is likely that Europe will want its own companies and platforms to build technological fortifications against its former ally and protector. Chinese firms will try to expand in Europe, too, although they may also face greater public skepticism. Either way, the end result will be lower profits, weakened American innovation, and a more isolated and insecure United States.

JELLO ON THE WALL

Not too long ago, things weren’t so complicated. Silicon Valley’s business model seemed to go hand in hand with Washington’s geopolitical consensus. The U.S. government and U.S. tech companies agreed that the future lay in building a world that was safe for liberal politics and economics. The spread of the Internet and social media would inexorably undermine the power of autocratic governments. President Bill Clinton famously told China in 2000 that trying to control the Internet was like trying to nail Jello to the wall, and President George W. Bush funded the creation and spread of “liberation technology” that might nibble away at the foundations of dictatorship.

When social media seemed to amplify demonstrations in Iran in 2009, the Goldman Sachs executive Jared Cohen was working in President Barack Obama’s State Department. He asked Twitter to delay a technical downtime so that the platform would remain accessible to protesters. To be sure, the protests weren’t solely dependent on social media. Cohen would nevertheless go on to co-author a book with Schmidt, celebrating the power of technology to spread freedom and underpin shared prosperity.

U.S. tech firms could lose access to the European market.

Other technology companies supported this missionary zeal to remake the planet. In a notorious 2016 internal presentation, Andrew Bosworth, one of the “most trusted lieutenants” of Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg, told Facebook staff that someone might perhaps die because of bullying on Facebook’s services or in a terrorist attack coordinated with Facebook’s tools. Nonetheless, as the journalists Ryan Mac, Charlie Warzel, and Alex Kantrowitz reported in BuzzFeed in 2018, Bosworth argued that Facebook would go on. Its mission to connect the world, including, eventually, China, was “de facto good,” even if a few people had to suffer along the way.

Certainly, people suffered. In the early 2010s, as the autocratic regime in Myanmar seemed to start opening up, technology evangelists such as Schmidt argued that the country should embrace Internet freedom on the principle that “the answer to bad speech is more speech.” Government officials and religious extremists in Myanmar discovered other possibilities. They used Facebook to propagandize against the Rohingya minority, helping fuel a widespread program of genocide in 2016. Facebook lacked the technical and local language capacities to see what was happening, let alone to do anything about it.

Connecting the world did not, in fact, convert illiberal societies to liberalism. After Trump became president in 2016, many worried that the Internet instead made previously liberal societies more illiberal, drenching publics with disinformation. Some of Trump’s critics used sketchy arguments and weak empirical evidence to accuse Facebook and other social media services of having allowed Russian propagandists to manipulate Americans into voting for a leader with authoritarian predilections. Social media services responded by introducing new antidisinformation tools in the United States and other core markets, while often skimping on such safeguards in poorer countries.

LINES IN THE SAND

Another important transformation occurred around this time. During the first Trump administration, most U.S. politicians became China hawks. They began to think of technology not as a means of liberating China from autocracy but rather as a way to hobble Beijing’s ambitions. When Google’s “Project Dragonfly”—a planned censorship-friendly search engine for the Chinese market—was leaked in 2018, Democrats and Republicans both condemned it, while the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested that it was “inexplicable” that Google was still investing in an autocratic country whose values were so at odds with those of the United States. Google abandoned its ambitions to return to China.

Big Tech tacked with the political winds, embracing the new technological confrontation. Business leaders also began to seriously rethink the role of technology in a world of geopolitical rivalry. Schmidt, who had stepped down from his role leading Google’s parent company, chaired a highly influential bipartisan commission whose final report in 2021 argued that the United States needed to beat China at artificial intelligence. It could do so by both building up its technological strengths at home and denying China access to the specialized semiconductors best suited to train the most advanced AI models.

Others combined grand geopolitical theory with narrowly self-interested pleading. Zuckerberg, Meta’s CEO, told Congress in 2020 that if U.S. authorities acted to regulate Meta too harshly or break it up, the United States would actually be helping Chinese competitors such as TikTok undermine American technological dominance. A plethora of Silicon Valley companies that had previously held the U.S. national security state at a distance began to realize that it offered an enormous new business market and joined the likes of the data analytics firm Palantir in trying to sell their services and platforms to the government.

U.S. tech seemed well positioned for Trump’s return to power this year, even before the billionaire tech entrepreneur Elon Musk became Trump’s universal plenipotentiary. Before last year’s election, influential figures such as Zuckerberg and the Amazon founder Jeff Bezos began cozying up to the new regime; Zuckerberg courted Trump in private phone calls and, over the summer of 2024, removed restrictions that had been placed on Trump’s Facebook and Instagram accounts, while Bezos scrapped a planned endorsement by The Washington Post—the paper he owns—for Trump’s rival, Kamala Harris. After Trump won, both Zuckerberg and Bezos made pilgrimages to visit the president-elect at his residence, Mar-a-Lago. Trump clearly relished their obeisance, commenting in December that “everyone wanted to be my friend.” For their part, many tech leaders were hopeful that Trump’s victory would be a boon for them; Trump seemed hawkish on China and willing to deregulate tech. Companies such as Facebook and Google had given up on expanding into the China market anyway and hoped instead for a Trump administration that would gear up against their Chinese competitors and also push back against European regulations that Zuckerberg described in January as tantamount to a “censorship” regime.

TRANSATLANTIC DECOUPLING?

Big Tech’s leaders certainly didn’t want to make an enemy of Trump and had some reason to believe that he might help them. Tech CEOs and owners, including Bezos, Schmidt’s successor Sundar Pichai, and Zuckerberg were willing to be displayed at Trump’s second inauguration like so many hunting trophies mounted on the wall.

Unfortunately, none of them are really getting what they hoped for. To be sure, Trump’s second administration dislikes both domestic regulations and EU rules. However, at least for the moment, the government is continuing an antitrust case against Google that stemmed from investigations in Trump’s first term and is preparing actions against Amazon, Apple, and Meta. Trump seems happy to allow the Chinese-owned social media platform TikTok to keep operating in the United States, perhaps paving the way for a broader deal with China. And the Trump administration has evinced naked hostility to the EU, as evidenced by the private contempt for Europe expressed by Vice President JD Vance in leaked Signal messages. Rather than renegotiating the United States’ technology relationship with Europe on better terms, Trump’s demands that Europe back off from regulating U.S. tech companies (and that Denmark hand over Greenland) may lead Europeans to ask a question that U.S. tech firms don’t want them to ask: Is Europe’s reliance on American tech not just a competitiveness problem but a critical national security vulnerability?

Even during Trump’s first term, many Europeans found such questions unthinkable. The United States had supported Europe for decades. Although Europeans resented the dominance of American Big Tech, they had never seen an alternative or even necessarily wanted one. Casper Bowden, a British privacy advocate and former Microsoft employee, recounted how Europeans literally laughed at him when he warned about the surveillance risks of U.S. cloud computing in the years before the Snowden revelations.

Now, everyone in Europe can see the risks of relying on U.S. tech. The most obvious example is Starlink, the satellite communications firm owned by Musk. When the United States wanted to put pressure on Ukraine regarding possible negotiations to end the war with Russia, the White House suggested that it would deny access to Starlink, which provided the Ukrainian military with critical battlefield resources. Other European countries, now fearing that the United States might sell them out for temporary advantage, took note. They, too, depend on Starlink and other software, hardware, and technology for their daily operations. Europeans are moving away from Starlink as quickly as they can, with the European Commission investigating how it can support domestic alternatives. European car buyers, meanwhile, are turning away from Musk’s Tesla. Unfortunately for Silicon Valley, in the eyes of many Europeans, Amazon Web Services, Microsoft’s Azure business cloud services, and Facebook, too, all risk becoming damaged brands.

It’s not just that technology might be turned off but that it might be used against European interests. Musk’s intervention on the side of far-right groups in Germany and the United Kingdom, attacking mainstream parties, has many European capitals on edge. Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez has taken the argument a step further, warning that “tech billionaires want to overthrow democracy.”

BREAK THE INTERNET

There is an even greater threat to U.S. tech companies that has gotten far less attention. In sharp contrast to today’s United States, the European Union has a strong commitment to the rule of law, obliging politicians to comply with judge’s rulings. The Trump administration’s scofflaw tendencies and tech companies’ increasing hostility toward European values may lead to the collapse of the EU-U.S. arrangements on which tech companies such as Alphabet, Meta, and Microsoft depend.

Schmidt worried a decade ago that an EU-U.S. data dispute might collapse the Internet. Snowden showed how U.S. intelligence agencies had illicitly accessed European social media and Internet search data, breaching European privacy rules. That dispute was patched over by an ungainly agreement, negotiated between the European Commission and the U.S. government. The EU agreed to allow data flows, as long as the United States committed to protecting the privacy rights of EU citizens and offered some means of redress if they were violated by U.S. surveillance agencies. The keystone of the arrangement was a 2016 U.S. commitment that Washington’s surveillance agencies would respect European privacy rights through a process overseen by an obscure U.S. body, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.

This arrangement made nobody happy but provided legal and political cover for flows of data across the Atlantic. Meta continued to operate Facebook in Europe, and companies such as Amazon, Google, and Microsoft were able to host Europeans’ personal data on their cloud-computing platforms. For those companies, the stakes couldn’t be higher. Google alone makes over $100 billion in sales in Europe.

That arrangement is now on the verge of disintegrating, with the operations of U.S. tech companies in Europe in serious jeopardy. The Trump administration has not only fired most of the PCLOB’s members; it has also made clear in multiple ways that it will not comply with those legal rules that it finds inconvenient. The executive order that formed the PCLOB is under review—but even if it formally stays on the books, no one trusts the Trump administration to abide by it.

Everyone in Europe can see the risks of relying on U.S. tech.

This potentially opens up the arrangement to challenge by activists such as Max Schrems, a canny Austrian privacy advocate, whose legal complaints led to the collapse of two previous arrangements. As Schrems’s organization has already warned, it may soon be illegal for any European entity to use U.S. cloud services to store personal data or for companies such as Meta to move data on European citizens back and forth between Europe and the United States. That would likely destroy Meta’s business model while making it difficult for companies such as Google and Microsoft to offer safe cloud services in Europe. Even if they segregate European data from U.S. data, they will be vulnerable to U.S. demands to share information held on their European servers or to stop offering robust encryption to European customers.

This time, there will be no plausible agreement between the two regimes. European judges and national privacy regulators will be extremely skeptical of promises from the Trump administration, and rightly so. European judges are not subject to the same political pressures as European politicians or European Commission officials. They see themselves as the guardians of national laws and a European constitutional order, which Trump and his officials want to undermine. Nor will judges be sympathetic to U.S. tech companies. A decade ago, these companies were able to disassociate themselves from the excesses of the U.S. government, deploring the U.S. surveillance programs that they sometimes had been unaware of. Now, their owners and CEOs have quite literally lined up to display their support for Trump, undermining possible excuses and claims of independence.

Google and Microsoft currently control two-thirds of the European market for cloud computing. However, European politicians, academics, think tanks, and entrepreneurs are already converging on the notion that Europe needs to build its own cloud resources to gain the strategic autonomy that it needs to wean itself from U.S. technology. A European court ruling against EU-U.S. data flows would dramatically accelerate these plans. So, too, could sweeping U.S. trade tariffs, which Europe might respond to by restricting U.S. technology services.

If that happens, Big Tech will have no one to blame but itself. Its response to geopolitical changes has been to build a closer relationship with the U.S. government, anticipating that it could continue to thrive in a world of U.S.-Chinese rivalry. Tech leaders willingly embraced Trump after his reelection, when they could have kept their distance. Big Tech companies may be about to discover that not only are they never going to have access to the Chinese market but they are increasingly persona non grata in European markets, too.

These fraying ties may mark the end of the dream of a global Internet, in which everyone shares the same services. Just as in China, European platforms may continue to use the Internet as the technological foundation for their services. But they will begin to construct their own alternative platforms on top, walled away from U.S. interference through Europe-only business models and strong encryption. This will not just lower U.S. profits; it will further damage the transatlantic security relationship. Schmidt’s prophecy may come true a decade later than he expected, and U.S. tech companies will have been complicit in bringing it to fruition.

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• NPR CEO Katherine Maher faces congressional scrutiny as Republicans push to defund the network over alleged ideological bias.
• Maher’s background includes roles in U.S.-backed NGOs during Middle East regime-change efforts and Wikipedia’s censorship policies.
• Lawmakers will question her past statements on race, gender, capitalism, and collaboration with governments to suppress online content.
• Critical focus on NPR’s perceived left-wing slant, including lack of conservative representation and taxpayer funding concerns.
• Maher’s social media history shows support for deplatforming opponents and critiques of free speech as a "white Western construct."