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Yes, Somali Immigrants Commit More Crime Than Natives

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  • Immigrant crime debate: national attention on Somali-linked welfare fraud in Minnesota prompts Trump to send federal agents amid arguments over Somali immigrant crime rates.
  • Initial incarceration claim: Alex Nowrasteh’s ACS-based chart shows Somali-born incarceration slightly lower than native-born Americans, implying equivalent crime levels.
  • Methodological critique: incarceration is a stock, not a flow, so comparing Somali newcomers to lifelong Americans biases results downward due to differences in time spent in the U.S.
  • Global evidence: Denmark and Norway data, which measure crime by origin, show Somali immigrants convicted at several multiples of native rates, contradicting U.S. parity claim.
  • Refined sample: pooling ACS data from 2006–2024, focusing on males 18–29, and limiting Somalis to those arriving by age 15 improves the apples-to-apples comparison.
  • Youth incarceration gap: under this refined approach, Somali-born young men are incarcerated at roughly twice the U.S.-born rate and nearly four times the non-Hispanic white rate.
  • Expanded modeling: extending to ages 18–64 with controls for year, age, and state yields Somali odds of incarceration over two and a half times U.S.-born males and more than four and a half times non-Hispanic whites.
  • Cultural persistence: cited research on immigrant behavior and Somalia’s corruption ranking supports the view that cultural and institutional gaps persist, reinforcing that concerns about Somali criminal involvement cannot be dismissed lightly.

Since the news of Minnesota’s sprawling Somali-linked fraud cases went national, debate over immigrant crime has flared once again. President Trump has dispatched federal agents to the Twin Cities to crack down on illegal immigrants. But Trump is overreacting, critics contend: the Somali immigrant population, they claim, does not have particularly high crime rates.

Alex Nowrasteh of the Cato Institute, for instance, set off considerable debate on X by posting a chart showing that Somali-born immigrants have, if anything, slightly lower incarceration rates than native-born Americans. Among those aged 18 to 54 included in the 2023 American Community Survey (ACS), 1,170 of every 100,000 people born in Somalia were incarcerated, versus 1,221 for the native-born.

The implication is clear. If Somalis are incarcerated at similar or lower rates, concerns about Somali crime must be overblown.

We don’t buy this argument. Nowrasteh is not making an apples-to-apples comparison. Looking at incarceration rates introduces statistical bias in a way that yields a lower-than-expected rate of Somali offending. Correcting for this, we estimate Somalis are twice as likely to be incarcerated as are similar native-born Americans.

Nowrasteh’s conclusion is starkly at odds with international evidence on Somali immigrant crime rates. In countries such as Denmark and Norway, which practice more thorough record-keeping than the United States, Somali immigrants are convicted or formally charged at several multiples of native rates. If the U.S. truly had crime rates near parity, it would represent an extraordinary and unexplained divergence. What’s in the water in Minneapolis?

There are no U.S. data explicitly measuring crime rates by nationality or country of birth. The nation’s major crime datasets don’t record immigration status. Instead, the figures that Nowrasteh and others cite on related questions come from the ACS, a general-purpose Census Bureau survey of roughly 3 million people each year.

The public ACS data report whether someone is living in “institutional group quarters,” which includes prisons but also other types of institutions such as mental-health facilities and nursing homes. This isn’t a perfect measure of incarceration, but for males aged 18 to 40 it is a very strong proxy.

Critically, however, incarceration and crime rates are not the same. Crime rates measure how often an event occurs—they are “flow” variables. Incarceration rates, by contrast, are a count of a population at any one time—they are “stocks.” Using unadjusted differences in incarceration rates between immigrants and natives to infer relative crime rates is therefore not a like-for-like comparison and can be deeply misleading.

Why? Consider a simple example: two groups of 40-year-old men, one American-born, the other immigrants who arrived in the U.S. at age 39. The groups are otherwise identical and have the same crime rates.

Will they be equally likely to be incarcerated at age 40? Obviously not. The immigrants will have had just one year to commit a crime and end up behind bars; the American-born will have had decades of opportunities to do so.

Accordingly, in this make-believe example, native-born Americans will be mechanically more likely to be incarcerated at age 40, even though the two groups have identical crime rates by design. By the same logic, their very different tenures in the United States mean that you cannot infer from incarceration rates that the immigrant group has a lower crime rate. Even if an immigrant group were to offend at very high rates, differences in tenure alone could still yield lower incarceration rates than those of native-born Americans who commit fewer crimes.

In Denmark or Norway, this problem does not arise, because crime rates are measured directly by country of origin. In the United States, by contrast, if we rely on institutionalization as a proxy for crime, we must confront its limitations head-on.

Ignoring those limits produces figures like Nowrasteh’s—which we can narrowly replicate, though the key Somali sample is very small—but which tell us almost nothing. Such results are not evidence of equal crime rates; they are artifacts of an invalid comparison. Treating the problem as negligible—or as unavoidable and therefore ignorable—does not make it go away.

To make a valid comparison, it is essential to compare people of similar ages and, in particular, to avoid contrasting lifelong Americans with immigrants who have spent only part of their potential offending years in the United States. Put simply, the latter have had fewer opportunities to acclimate to their surroundings, form criminal ties, accumulate a record, or commit serious violence—and thus to end up in prison as adults.

To do this, we follow Nowrasteh by using the ACS but also:

  • analyze all available ACS data together (back to 2006, and through the newly released 2024 data) to increase the sample size;
  • reduce sources of distortion by limiting the sample to males ages 18 to 29, for whom residence in institutional group quarters is a more reliable proxy for criminal involvement;
  • and make a closer-to-apples-to-apples comparison by comparing the American-born with the subset of Somalis who arrived in the U.S. when they were no older than 15 (few adults are incarcerated for crimes committed before this age). Notably, this is also a more relevant comparison for second and subsequent generations of immigrants.

The results are striking. Under this like-for-like comparison, young men born in Somalia have roughly twice the incarceration rate of those born in the United States (5,030 versus 2,450 per 100,000). Further, incarceration rates vary sharply by race in the United States. Compared with non-Hispanic white natives (1,280 per 100,000), the Somali-born rate is nearly four times higher. Analyses of older age groups reveal similarly large disparities.

We then expand the sample to cover ages 18 to 64, while preserving a comparable framework in a more sophisticated statistical model. The model controls for year (to capture changes in incarceration over time), individuals’ exact ages (to address remaining differences in age distributions between Somalis and natives), and state of residence (to account for variation in the severity of state justice systems). Under this specification, the odds that a Somali immigrant is incarcerated are more than two and a half times those for U.S.-born males, and more than four and a half times those for native non-Hispanic whites. Given that, historically, descendants of immigrants tend to get in more trouble than the newcomers did, this is not an encouraging sign for the future.

None of this should be so surprising. Even putting aside European data, a large body of research shows that migrants do not instantly shed the behavioral and cultural norms of their countries of origin. Raymond Fisman and Edward Miguel famously showed this reality in a study measuring unpaid parking tickets accrued by U.N. diplomats in New York: officials from more corrupt countries behaved far more corruptly, even under identical enforcement conditions, and these differences persisted over time.

Alberto Alesina and Paulo Giuliano, writing in the Journal of Economic Literature, concluded that “when immigrants move to a place with different institutions, overwhelmingly their cultural values change gradually, if ever, but rarely within two generations.” Transparency International, in its Corruption Perceptions Index, ranks Somalia 179th (out of 180) in the world. Simply put, a large institutional and cultural gap exists between Mogadishu and Minneapolis.

Given the limits of the ACS, we readily concede that our analysis remains constrained and cannot estimate a precise “Somali crime rate.” Ideally, crime by birthplace or immigration status would be measured directly—but absent such data, this approach may be the only credible way to assess criminal involvement among those who arrived as adults.

What is clear, however, is that the evidence does not support dismissing public concern as innumerate fearmongering. On the contrary, under an apples-to-apples comparison that focuses on individuals with comparable time spent in the United States, Somali immigrants exhibit incarceration rates far above the native-born average.

Matthew Lilley is a lecturer in economics and John Mitchell Fellow at the Australian National University. Robert VerBruggen is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute.

Photo: Myung J. Chun / Los Angeles Times via Getty Images

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bogorad
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The next Fed chair is . . . Donald Trump // A criminal investigation of Jay Powell is the latest in the reworking of the world’s most important financial institution

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  • Emergency precedent: Unscheduled weekend Fed statements have historically served as crisis responses during Bear Stearns, Lehman, Covid and regional bank failures.
  • Current alarm: Sunday’s video from Chair Powell carries the same unsettling tone, signaling the Fed feels under attack amid escalating tensions with the White House.
  • DOJ probe context: The investigation into Powell’s property renovations follows months of Trump’s legal threats and public pressure tied to rate policy disagreements.
  • Political meddling patterns: Actions such as targeting Fed governor Lisa Cook, appointing dovish Stephen Miran, and removing BLS official Erika McEntarfer reinforce concerns about politicized control over monetary data and policy.
  • Market re-stratification: Investors now categorize Fed members by appointing president, diversify away from U.S. Treasuries, and question the long-term stability of dollar dominance under perceived political influence.
  • Trump’s broader agenda: Beyond the Fed, he is seeking caps on credit card rates, restrictions on dividends, and compelled Venezuelan oil extraction — all suggesting an aggressive push to steer economic levers.

Unscheduled weekend statements from the Federal Reserve are, to put it mildly, not generally a good sign.

In the past couple of decades, they have been rare, and have come only in response to dire emergencies: the collapses of Bear Stearns and then of Lehman Brothers in 2008, the Covid pandemic of 2020 and the failure of several US regional banks in 2023.

On each occasion, the US central bank has scrambled together a statement to show leadership and action before markets open in response to a serious crisis.

It is well worth viewing Sunday’s video from Fed chair Jay Powell through that lens. The Fed is under attack. This is not a drill.

The news itself, that prosecutors have opened a criminal investigation in to Powell over renovations to Fed property, should not come as a huge surprise to those who have been paying attention to the increasingly tense relationship between the central bank and the new political regime. US President Donald Trump has long spoken in thuggish terms about Powell and the Fed chair’s reluctance to slash interest rates as fast as he would like. 

But name-calling has escalated to legal threats over the past few months. The only change now is that these threats appear to be crystallising, and that Powell is biting back. 

Trump himself denies any involvement in the Department of Justice investigation, and says it has nothing to do with the Fed’s rate policy. But no serious person believes any of this would have happened with a different person in the White House, just like the efforts to remove Fed governor Lisa Cook from her role, or the appointment of super-dovish Stephen Miran to the Fed’s rate-setting committee, or the ejection of Erika McEntarfer from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. (Her mistake, seemingly, was to oversee the publication of less-than-sunny employment data.)

For months, market participants have been obsessing over who will replace Powell when he is due to step aside in May. Which Kevin will be the new chair? Hassett or Warsh? How many slivers of percentage points would one be likely to cut rather than the other? Oh, the suspense! All the while, the risk of a profound reworking of the world’s most important financial institution has been bubbling up. We really do not need to talk about Kevin.

Investors already think and talk about US markets and rate-setting policy in radically new terms. Members of the rate-setting committee are now considered in buckets depending on which president was in charge when they were nominated, much like members of the Supreme Court. This has never happened before, now it is routine. Money managers are trying to diversify in debt markets other than US Treasuries, to reduce their reliance on loopy shifts in US policy. Again, new but routine. And they are increasingly doubtful that monetary policy from the Fed will be sensible enough, in the long term, to really justify the crucial role that US government bonds and the dollar occupy in global finance.

The latest clear, bright sign that the new political masters in the US mean business when it comes to greater control over the Fed takes this further, however. The next Fed chair will, in everything but name, be Donald Trump, with all the adventures in rate policy and regulatory supervision that entails. Good luck to us all.

So, why are markets not freaking out? For one thing, markets specialists are still clinging to the hope that, somehow, this will all work out OK. Speaking at an event in London on Monday, just hours after the latest Fed drama, Jan Hatzius, chief economist at Goldman Sachs, stressed that US monetary policy is set by committee, not by just one person. “I have no doubt that [Powell] in his remaining term as chair will make decisions based on the data,” Hatzius added. “My expectation again is that the committee will continue to make decisions on the back of their mandate and the economic data.”

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Hatzius may be right. The checks and balances really could kick in, and we should hope they do. Looking at Venezuela, Greenland and beyond, I am not so sure. We should be mindful, also, that markets professionals are straining every sinew to appear politically neutral and not to upset Trump. Finance bigwigs should be providing a full-throated defence of Fed independence at this point, but don’t hold your breath.

Second, remember that the big risk here is that the Fed lets the US economy, and inflation, run hot. All things equal, in the short term at least, that is positive for stocks, rather than negative. There’s no good reason for stocks to collapse on this news, and hence they have not. On bonds, sure, this is a horrible risk for the long term, but for now, with the US economy losing some momentum, some rate cuts are likely called for anyway. The new record-breaking ascent in the price of gold is the best measure of alarm we have for now. 

But this is clearly Trump’s market now. He wants to cap credit card rates, he wants to block certain companies from paying dividends to their shareholders, he wants to force US oil companies to extract oil from Venezuela that they don’t want. He expects companies to do his bidding.

Next, he wants the Fed. We have to assume a large risk at this point that he’ll get it.

katie.martin@ft.com

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bogorad
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Merz under pressure to ease ‘firewall’ against Germany’s far-right // Upcoming regional elections have reignited debate about CDU’s policy of excluding AfD

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  • Policy debate: Historian Andreas Rödder has renewed calls inside the CDU to reconsider its “firewall” barring cooperation with the far-right AfD as the party polls at above 25% nationally ahead of key regional votes.
  • Internal pushback: Many senior CDU figures, including Herbert Reul and Dennis Radtke, warn that any softening of the firewall would be a red line and risk democratic stability, while others fear Rödder’s criticisms could become self-fulfilling.
  • Coalition dilemma: Upcoming elections in Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern could produce hung parliaments, forcing Merz to choose between AfD support or a coalition with the ruled-out Die Linke and risking his SPD partnership.
  • Electoral pressure: Regional polling shows AfD approaching 40% in some states, and CDU insiders fear fragmentation and local discipline erosion if poor results persist.
  • Business sector involvement: Mittelstand representatives faced criticism after inviting AfD figures to a parliamentary evening, reflecting some corporate leaders’ belief that engagement with AfD MPs is increasingly unavoidable.
  • Red lines proposal: Rödder proposes a catalogue of constitutional “red lines” that would permit limited reliance on AfD votes outside those boundaries, while he rejects full coalition arrangements and emphasizes voters feeling excluded.
  • Historical stakes: The CDU’s 2018 resolution banning collaboration with the AfD and Die Linke reflects Germany’s postwar commitment to keep right-wing extremism out of power, a legacy that frames the current debate.

When German historian Andreas Rödder first suggested that his centre-right party review its policy of exclusion of the far right a little over two years ago, the idea was so taboo that it cost him his influential policy role with Christian Democratic Union leader Friedrich Merz.

Today, with the far-right Alternative for Germany polling above 25 per cent nationally, neck and neck with the CDU ahead of regional elections this year, Rödder no longer feels quite so isolated.

While he remains a minority voice, the upcoming votes are reigniting a debate on the possibility of dropping the party’s “firewall” that excludes working with the AfD.

Elections in two former communist states — where the AfD is likely to win, but remain short of a majority — are cause for particular concern. Such an outcome would put Merz in a bind because forming a majority coalition without the far-right party could mean teaming with the far-left Die Linke party, which the CDU has also explicitly ruled out.

“Demonising helps the AfD, I have the empirical argument on my side,” Rödder said. “I have no guarantee what I’m proposing would work. I just know that what the CDU is doing doesn’t.”

Rödder, who was chair of the influential values commission under Merz when the CDU was in opposition, had proposed in 2023 that the CDU debate whether it might rely on AfD in some regional parliamentary votes. He has continued to attack the long-standing firewall, known as the Brandmauer, since the CDU came into government in May.

In October, another senior party figure, former CDU secretary-general Peter Tauber, expressed doubt over the logic of the firewall in an interview in Stern magazine.

Merz has said the far-right party wants to eradicate and replace the CDU. He ruled out coalition talks or relying on its votes, casting his government as the last chance to show German voters that mainstream parties can deliver. Any move to co-operate would also rip apart his governing coalition with the Social Democrats [SPD].

The argument inside the CDU mirrors debates across Europe, where far-right movements that were once on the fringes of politics are challenging the firewalls and “cordons sanitaires” built by the established parties to exclude them from power. In Germany, however, the issue is uniquely fraught, shaped by the trauma of Nazism and a postwar commitment never again to allow rightwing extremism access to power.

The CDU banned co-operation with the AfD and Die Linke in a resolution in 2018. Founded five years earlier, the AfD had emerged and gained in strength in reaction to policies enacted under former CDU chancellor Angela Merkel, including the Greek bailout and her decision to admit nearly 1mn refugees in 2015.

Andreas Rödder, right, was chair of the influential values commission under Friedrich Merz, centre, when the CDU was in opposition © IMAGO/IPON/Reuters Connect

Many CDU officials are still warning against easing the firewall. Herbert Reul, Nord-Rhine-Westphalia’s interior minister, said in December that the AfD was “one of the greatest dangers to our democracy”, and that he would quit the party if it softened its stance.

Dennis Radtke, another top CDU official, echoed the threat: “This would also be a red line for me, as for a lot of other people.”

A senior CDU figure who served in one of Merkel’s cabinets cautioned that Rödder’s relentless attacks on the firewall risked turning its collapse into “a self-fulfilling prophecy”.

Conservative voters are divided. A Forsa poll conducted before 2024 regional elections in the east showed that 45 per cent of CDU members thought it made sense to work with the AfD “on a case-by-case basis”, while the rest ruled out any form of collaboration.

Elon Musks speaks live at an AfD rally in January last year © Sean Gallup/Getty Images

Party insiders worry that poor results in regional elections could erode discipline, particularly at local level, as fragmented parliaments become increasingly hard to govern.

Merz’s resolve will be tested in elections this year in Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, where the AfD — boosted by popular dissatisfaction at migration policy and the failure of Europe’s largest economy to rebound from years of stagnation — is forecast to approach 40 per cent of the vote.

Merz’s CDU may face a dilemma in September if Saxony-Anhalt produces a hung parliament, with polls suggesting it may need support from parties including Die Linke to block the AfD from power. If the AfD secures an outright majority, it would control its first regional parliament and get a seat in the Bundesrat, the chamber that represents state governments and must approve legislation passed by the Bundestag.

Debate is also spreading in business circles, with some corporate leaders arguing that engagement with AfD MPs is unavoidable.

In October, an association representing the Mittelstand — small and medium-sized companies — caused uproar by inviting AfD figures to a parliamentary evening in Berlin. The group’s chair, Marie-Christine Ostermann, sits on the advisory board of Rödder’s conservative think-tank, R21.

Branding the AfD as racists and excluding it from public discourse has failed to halt its rise, according to political scientist Werner Patzelt.

“Voters feel that the CDU cannot deliver centre-right policies because it is constantly forced into coalitions with the Social Democrats or the Greens,” Patzelt said.

Rödder was born in a rural Catholic part of western Germany. The 58-year-old Mainz university professor of modern European history describes his values “as conservative liberal”, which he says got lost during Merkel’s CDU/SPD grand coalition years.

He dismissed the classification of the AfD as an extremist party by the intelligence services, saying that the constitutional court is ultimately the sole judge of this.

Hopes for a ‘‘Christian Democratic reorientation’’ under Merz have been frustrated by the compromises the chancellor has been forced to make with the SPD, Rödder argued.

Andreas Rödder: ‘What I’m doing is thinking through how to deal with the AfD in a polarised society’ © imago images/Mauersberger/Reuters Connect

Critics accuse Rödder of seeking to build bridges to the AfD through ultra-conservative media outlets such as Nius, set up by a former Bild editor.

He rejected that. “What I’m doing is thinking through how to deal with the AfD in a polarised society,” he said.

He said he was worried about “the 20 per cent of the electorate who feel excluded not only from decision-making but also from expressing an opinion”.

His proposal centres on defining a catalogue of constitutional and political “red lines”, outside of which the CDU would accept relying on AfD backing. “I am not in favour of coalition or co-operation,” he insisted.

Critics of Rödder note that Merz has already tested this idea before he was elected as chancellor — with poor results. After an Afghan migrant fatally stabbed a toddler during the campaign, he submitted a nonbinding parliamentary motion on asylum laws, which passed only with AfD support — the first such majority since the war.

The move failed to lift the CDU in national elections a month afterwards but energised Die Linke, while the AfD secured a record 21 per cent of the vote.

Rödder’s red lines strategy was perilous, said Uwe Jun, a political scientist at Trier University. “Those who want to erase these boundaries will always be on the offensive. Those who draw them will have to defend them — constantly.”

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Google introduces personalised shopping ads to AI tools

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  • Personalised AI Ads: Google is rolling out personalised advertising within its AI shopping tools to monetise free chatbot users and compete with OpenAI.
  • Exclusive Offers: Advertisers can present exclusive deals to shoppers using Google’s Gemini-powered AI mode while preparing to buy items.
  • Monetisation Push: The initiative expands Google’s effort to monetise popular AI chatbots, leveraging Gemini 3 to challenge OpenAI’s GPT-5.
  • Alternative to Search Ads: The feature shifts beyond traditional sponsored search ads by offering flexible deals like lower prices, bundles, or free shipping.
  • Behaviour-Based Triggers: Google’s AI will determine when to display offers based on shopping behavior and likely purchases.
  • Competition in Ecommerce: Other AI firms such as OpenAI, Microsoft, and Perplexity are also integrating ecommerce capabilities to generate revenue.
  • Commerce Protocol: Google introduced a universal commerce protocol enabling shopping agents to research and buy without leaving its platform alongside partners like Walmart and Shopify.
  • Offer Creation: Retailers can set up deals, with Google’s AI choosing optimal timing; initial pilots focus on discounts before expanding to bundles and free shipping.

Google is introducing new personalised advertising into its AI shopping tools, as it seeks to make money from the hundreds of millions of people who use its chatbot for free and gain market share from rival OpenAI.

Advertisers will be able to present exclusive offers to shoppers who are preparing to buy an item through Google’s AI mode, which is powered by its Gemini model, the Alphabet-owned tech giant announced on Sunday.

The move marks a push by Google to gain an edge in the race to monetise popular chatbots, as it looks to build on the success of its latest large language model, Gemini 3, which has gained ground against OpenAI’s GPT-5.

It also represents a move away from the tech giant’s traditional ‘sponsored’ ad placements in search results, which generate tens of billions of dollars for the company but has come under threat by the rise of AI chatbots.

“It is a new concept that moves beyond our traditional search ads model,” said Vidhya Srinivasan, vice-president of Google Ads and Commerce.

“It essentially gives retailers the flexibility to deliver value to people shopping in AI mode, whether that’s a lower price, a special bundle or free shipping. In the moment, it matters most . . . to just close the sale,” she added.

Google’s AI will determine when to display an offer based on users’ shopping behaviour and what they are likely to purchase

Google’s new ads feature will see it move a step forward from its AI rivals by enabling brands to offer highly personalised advertising through its chatbot, such as a discount code.

Last month, OpenAI put on hold internal discussions about advertising products after chief executive Sam Altman declared a “code red” over the need to improve ChatGPT, amid concerns rivals were narrowing its early lead in the race to develop the cutting-edge technology.

Google is leveraging its huge market share in online search to put its AI model in front of billions of users, via the “AI Mode” that it added to search pages last year. Its standalone chatbot Gemini still lags ChatGPT in popularity.

AI groups, including OpenAI, Microsoft and Perplexity, have rushed to launch ecommerce features in their chatbots over the past year as they hunt for new ways to generate revenue from their popular but costly AI products.

OpenAI has been rolling out its checkout feature, first reported by the FT, which sees the AI start-up take a cut of the sales made on ChatGPT.

Microsoft launched its Copilot Checkout on Thursday, which also provides users with recommendations and checkout in its AI chats. The group said shopping through Copilot led to 53 per cent more purchases within 30 minutes of interaction compared to those without.

Google also introduced a “universal commerce protocol”, which it said would enable shopping agents to research products and make purchases without leaving its platform. The protocol was developed with large retailers and marketplaces including Walmart, Target and Shopify.

“We need to work together. I think if we do it well, it’s an extraordinary expansionary moment,” Google chief executive Sundar Pichai said at the National Retail Federation’s annual show in New York.

Google’s new ads feature will make use of the contextual information from peoples’ conversation with the chatbot in AI mode, and trigger offers on relevant products that user have clicked on.

Retailers can set up offers they want to be available, with Google then using AI to determine when it is best to display the deal to a potential customer.

Srinivasan said Google was “initially focusing on discounts for the pilot and will expand to support the creation of offers with other attributes that help shoppers prioritise value over price alone, such as bundles and free shipping”.

Existing Google shopping partners include pet brand Petco and make-up retailer e.l.f. Cosmetics and luggage manufacturer Samsonite.

Additional reporting by Gregory Meyer in New York

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Minneapolis Is Not Even A Close Call --A Lawsplainer On Officer-Involved Shootings

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  • Justification: ICE officer justified in deadly force use because driver refused to stop and posed threat while evading detention.
  • Authority: ICE Special Agents have criminal investigator authority, can detain or arrest U.S. citizens obstructing Title 8 or Title 18 enforcement.
  • Federal Law: Title 18 U.S.C. §111 criminalizes interference with federal officers, with escalating penalties when contact, intent, or weapons are involved.
  • Assault Definition: Assault on federal officer includes threats creating fear of harm even without physical contact, as affirmed in Eighth Circuit jury instructions and cases like Yates and Street.
  • Vehicle as Weapon: Courts, including Eighth Circuit in Wallace, recognize automobiles used aggressively as deadly weapons even absent impact, mirroring facts in Renee Good case.
  • Reasonableness: Fourth Amendment reasonableness for deadly force considers officer’s perception of imminent threat to self or others, referencing Garner, Graham, Scott, Plumhoff, Barnes.
  • Totality: Barnes v. Felix emphasizes totality of circumstances without temporal limits, including prior conduct and public safety risks from fleeing driver.
  • Evidence: Photographic sequence shows driver shifting into drive, aligning vehicle toward officer, prompting immediate weapon draw and lethal force in self-defense and defense of others.

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The Image above proves the ICE Officer was justified in his decision to use deadly force. He had no obligation to step out of the way that would benefit her or subject him to prosecution. He had no obligation to allow her to drive away from an attempt to detain her after the Officer at the door of her car ordered her to stop and exit the vehicle.

ICE has two sets of law enforcement personnel — Special Agents who are criminal investigators, and deportation officers who process civil deportation cases. Special Agents are covered by GS-1811 series position with a general description of “criminal investigator.” They are armed and possess police powers to investigate and make arrests for any crime committed in their presence, as well as for the enforcement of all crimes under Title 8 of the United States Code — “Aliens and Nationality.” Within their authority are crimes under Title 18 such as “conspiracy” and “obstruction” that intefere with their enforcement of the provisions of Title 8.

But the claim floating around social media that ICE officers have no jurisdiction over U.S. citizens is simply wrong. They are law enforcement officers with the authority to detain citizens briefly as part of their investigatory powers, and to arrest citizens who conspire to obstruct and/or do actually obstruct their lawful operations.

Title 18 U.S.C. Sec. 111 is a federal criminal statute involving interference with federal law enforcement:

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Section 1114 includes within its designation “any officer or employee of the United States or of any agency in any branch of the United States Government (including any member of the uniformed services) while such officer or employee is engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties….”

Subsection (a)(1) makes it a federal crime: assault, resist, oppose, impede, intimidate, or interfere with such employees while they are engaged in or on account of their performance of their official duties.

Without more, such a crime is subject to a maximum penalty of up to 1 year in prison — a misdemeanor.

However, where such acts involve “physical contact” with the officer, or an intent to commit another felony, the maximum penalty increases to 8 years — a felony.

Finally, if in the commission of the offense the defendant uses a “deadly or dangerous weapon”, or “inflicts bodily injury” on the officer, the maximum penalty increases to 20 years.

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, with includes the District of Minnesota, has adopted the Manual of Model Jury Instructions to define the elements of certain crimes. Under the Model Instruction 6.18.111, “assault” on a federal officer is defined as:

An “assault” is any intentional and voluntary attempt or threat to do injury to the person of another, when coupled with t_he apparent present ability to do so_ sufficient to put the person against whom the attempt is made in fear of immediate bodily harm.7

Footnote 7: The statute prohibits any acts or threats of bodily harm that might reasonably that might reasonably deter a federal official from the performance of his or her duties. Even if there is no physical contact, the force requirement is satisfied even if the defendant’s conduct places the officer in fear for his life or safety. See United States v. YatesUnited States v. Street.…

In Yates, the defendant aimed his truck at a police vehicle as he was driving, but the officer was able to steer away and avoid a collision, i.e., no “contact.”

In the Street case, the incident involved only verbal threats to kill the officers, but no contact. The Eighth Circuit noted how broadly Congress chose to write Sec. 111:

In enacting Section(s) 111, Congress intended broadly to prohibit harm or threats thereof to certain federal officials…. "In order to protect the law enforcement function itself, the statute must be read as prohibiting any acts or threats of bodily harm that might reasonably deter a federal official from the performance of his or her duties." … Congress created the single crime of harming or threatening a federal official, and specified six ways by which the crime could be committed.

Case law across the country has held that any kind of instrument that can be employed as a weapon — even if designed for another purpose — satisfies this provision. Not surprisingly, case law across the country is replete with instances where automobiles were used for purposes other than transportation, with the driver turning them into weapons.

In 2017, the Eighth Circuit decided United States v. Wallace. In that case the defendant was charged with using her vehicle as a deadly or dangerous weapon in the parking lot of a VA Hospital. She was convicted under Sec. 111(b), and sentenced to 48 months in prison. The guideline range was 188-235 months.

"[F]or a car to qualify as a deadly weapon, the defendant must use it as a deadly weapon and not simply as a mode of transportation." United States v. Arrington , 309 F.3d 40, 45 (D.C. Cir. 2002). For instance, using a car "purely for flight" would not trigger liability under § 111(b). …. The jury could nevertheless have reasonably found that by driving toward Atlas and forcing him to jump on the hood to avoid being hit, Wallace used the car as something other than transportation—that she used it as a deadly or dangerous weapon.

The facts of Wallace were that a federal police officer approached the vehicle in a VA parking lot after he observed a person walk to and enter the vehicle after he directed her to stop. The driver then backed the vehicle out of a parking stall, ignoring the officer’s commands that she stop. After the driver had backed out of the parking stall, the officer positioned himself in front of the stationary vehicle and yelled to the driver "Shut the vehicle off. Get out of the vehicle. Police."

When Wallace did not comply, Atlas grabbed his gun. When he saw the kids, though, he holstered it and told Wallace again to shut the car down. But the car lunged forward toward Atlas, who, in his words "instinctively jumped, and I landed on the hood." Atlas jumped on the hood to avoid being struck as "[t]he vehicle came at me."

As noted, Wallace was convicted of violating Sec. 111(b) — assault on a federal police officer while using a vehicle as a deadly weapon.

She did not strike the officer with the vehicle — he jumped on the hood to avoid behind hit.

Does this sound familiar?

The point is that Renee Good committed an aggravated felony against the ICE Officer before he drew his weapon and fired his first shot.

IT DOES NOT MATTER WHETHER SHE ACTUALLY STRUCK HIM WITH HER VEHICLE.

As the jury instruction states, the assault is complete “if the defendant’s conduct places the officer in fear for his life or safety…”

That means that when the ICE Officer fired his weapon, he was attempting to “seize” a fleeing felon. All uses of force — lethal and non-lethal — to immobilize a suspected criminal offender are “seizures.” The Fourth Amendment requires that seizures be “reasonable” in order to comply with the Fourth Amendment.

The use of deadly force is a reasonable seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes when engaged in for self-defense responding to conduct that is reasonably perceived by the officer to pose a threat of death or serious bodily injury to him or others around him.

This is the second legal point that is being widely mischaracterized on social media — the Officer’s perception of an imminent threat of death or bodily injury is not limited just to the threat to himself, it is what he perceives as a threat to himself AND others in his immediate vicinity and the broader community in the direction of the vehicle’s intended travel.

What follows is a BRIEF recap of Supreme Court decisions over the past 40+ years dealing with officer-involved shootings under the Fourth Amendment and the inherent right of self-defense and defense of others.

Modern changes in the use of deadly force as a law enforcement tool began with the Supreme Court’s decision in Tennessee v. Garner to move away from the common law rule that allowed such force to be used against “fleeing felons.” An interesting factual tidbit that underpinned that common law rule was at the founding was that nearly all “felonies” were punishable by death.

Tennessee v. Garner — 1985:

This case DOES NOT involve the issue of self-defense by an officer in fear. Prior to Garner, there was a view that a “fleeing felon” was — by virtue of that fact — a danger to the community even if not to the officer at the time of the encounter.

The facts were that at 10:45 pm two officers responded to a “prowler” call by a neighbor who heard a window breaking at the house next door. One officer went into the back yard and saw an Garner running away from the house in the direction of a chain-link fence. He shouted to the suspect “Police, halt” and moved towards him. As he did Garner began to climb the fence. Fearing he would evade arrest if he made it over the fence, the officer fatally shot him. A Tennessee statute authorized police to use “all force necessary” to make an arrest if, after an intention to arrest is announced, the suspect flees or forcibly resists.

The officer stated he was not fearful for his life or safety. He saw no sign of a weapon, and, though not certain, was "reasonably sure" and "figured" that Garner was unarmed. Tennessee statute justified deadly force on the basis that an un-apprehended felony posed a danger to the community. The Supreme Court took up the case to decide whether such actions were “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment when the only purpose for using deadly force was to prevent escape and there was no factual basis to conclude the suspect was actually a threat to the community if not arrested.

Here is the landmark ruling by the Supreme Court on the Fourth Amendment, moving away from the common law:

The use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable…. Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so. It is no doubt unfortunate when a suspect who is in sight escapes… A police officer may not seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead. The Tennessee statute is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes the use of deadly force against such fleeing suspects.

It is not, however, unconstitutional on its face. Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force. Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape.

That is the law, and has been the law for 40 years.

Did the ICE Officer in Minneapolis have “probable cause” to believe Ms. Good had committed a crime involving the threatened infliction of serious physical harm? If yes … “deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape.”

As noted above, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon on a federal law enforcement officer does NOT require actual physical contact or injury to the officer. Whether Good hit the ICE Officer or not does not change the “reasonableness” determination.

Graham v. Connor — 1989.

Four years after Garner, the Supreme Court held that the question of “reasonableness” under the Fourth Amendment with respect to claims of “excessive force” used by law enforcement officers to make an arrest. Connor is not a “deadly force” case, but does establish the framework for determining whether the force used — deadly or otherwise — was “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.

Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in a 9-0 decision, held that excessive force claims during any “seizure” of a person must be evaluated under an “objective reasonableness” test that looks at whether the officer’s actions were reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances, without regard to subjective intent or motivations of the officer.

The “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight…. The Fourth Amendment is not violated by an arrest based on probable cause, even though the wrong person is arrested … nor by the mistaken execution of a valid search warrant on the wrong premises …. With respect to a claim of excessive force, the same standard of reasonableness at the moment applies: “Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers,” … violates the Fourth Amendment. The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments -- in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving -- about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.

The law on excessive force — even use of deadly force — tolerates mistakes. Based on the facts, I do not believe the ICE officer’s use of deadly force was a “mistake.” His reaction to what Ms. Good did in the 2-3 seconds before he fired his weapon were entirely justified by her actions.

[T]he question is whether the officers' actions are "objectively reasonable" in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation…. An officer's evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officer's good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional.”

What would a reasonable officer standing the shoes of the ICE Officer who fired at Ms .Good have perceived in terms of his safety or the safety of others from her actions during the moments leading up him using deadly force to stop her? Did he have reasonable cause to believe she had committed a violent crime, and that allowing her to evade arrest would constitute a threat to others even if she was past him and no longer at threat to him?

Scott v. Harris — 2005.

Scott involved a high speed chase where the police officer used the bumper of his vehicle to bring the chase to an end by causing the suspect’s car to crash. The suspect was rendered a quadriplegic and sued for use of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment on the basis that running him off the road was an “unreasonable” seizure.

Writing for an 8-1 majority, Justice Scalia stated:

[The Officer] defends his actions by pointing to the paramount governmental interest in ensuring public safety…. Thus, in judging whether [the Officer’s] actions were reasonable, we must consider the risk of bodily harm that [the Officer’s] actions posed to respondent in light of the threat to the public that [the Officer] was trying to eliminate. Although there is no obvious way to quantify the risks on either side, it is clear from the videotape that respondent posed an actual and imminent threat to the lives of any pedestrians who might have been present, to other civilian motorists, and to the officers involved in the chase.

It makes no difference that Ms. Good was only beginning to drive away when she was shot by the ICE Officer. It was not unreasonable to conclude that after almost running over a uniformed law enforcement officer when she was fully aware of his presence and after being ordered out of the car, she might continue to operate her vehicle in a way that put others present at risk, including other motorists in the direction she was intending to travel.

We think it appropriate in this process to take into account not only the number of lives at risk, but also their relative culpability. It was respondent, after all, who intentionally placed himself and the public in danger … that ultimately produced the choice between two evils that [the Officer] confronted. Multiple police cars … had been chasing respondent…. By contrast, those who might have been harmed had [the Officer] not taken the action he did were entirely innocent. We have little difficulty in concluding it was reasonable for Scott to take the action that he did.

Just moments before the shooting, Ms. Good had parked her vehicle across the lane of travel in which she was headed, creating a hazard for other vehicles on the roadway. Ms. Good was completely aware and uncaring about the hazards she was creating for others by her conduct.

She capped it off with a felonious aggravated assault with a deadly weapon against the Officer as she attempted to evade a lawful effort to detain her for her obstructive behavior.

Couldn’t the innocent public equally have been protected, and the tragic accident entirely avoided, if the police had simply ceased their pursuit? We think the police need not have taken that chance and hoped for the best. Whereas [the Officer’s] action … was certain to eliminate the risk that respondent posed to the public, ceasing pursuit was not. First of all, there would have been no way to convey convincingly to respondent that the chase was off, and that he was free to go…. [R]espondent might have been just as likely to respond by continuing to drive recklessly as by slowing down and wiping his brow.

Second, we are loath to lay down a rule requiring the police to allow fleeing suspects to get away whenever they drive so recklessly that they put other people’s lives in danger…. The Constitution assuredly does not impose this invitation to impunity-earned-by-recklessness. Instead, we lay down a more sensible rule: A police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.

One of the dumbest arguments being advanced in social media and elsewhere is the effort to distinguish between the ICE Officer’s first shot through the front windshield — presumably while he was still in front of the vehicle and at risk of being run into — and later shots that were fired by him through the driver’s side window after he was no longer immediately threatened.

Besides this being a 20-20 hindsight analysis that runs contrary to Graham v. Connor, it also ignores a more recent 9-0 decision by the Supreme Court involving the use of deadly force against the driver of a vehicle.

Plumhoff v. Rickart — 2014, with Justice Alito writing for a unanious court:

Following a car-stop of a suspected drunk driver, and after just a few questions posed by the officer, the driver sped away. The officer gave chase and was eventually joined by five other cars. The chase lasted more than 5 minutes, and at times exceeded 100 mph.

The chase eventually ended in a parking lot where the suspect’s car collided with a police vehicle, and other vehicles made an effort to pin in the suspect’s car in — the high speed chase portion was over. But that wasn’t the end of the suspect’s efforts to flee:

Now in danger of being cornered, Rickard put his car into reverse “in an attempt to escape.” As he did so, Evans and Plumhoff got out of their cruisers and … Evans, gun in hand, pounded on the passenger-side window…. Rickard’s tires started spinning, and his car “was rocking back and forth,” indicating that Rickard was using the accelerator even though his bumper was flush against a police cruiser. At that point, Plumhoff fired three shots into Rickard’s car. Rickard then “reversed in a 180 degree arc” and “maneuvered onto” another street, forcing Ellis to “step to his right to avoid the vehicle.” Ibid. As Rickard continued “fleeing down” that street, ibid., Gardner and Galtelli fired 12 shots toward Rickard’s car, bringing the total number of shots fired during this incident to 15. Rickard then lost control of the car and crashed into a building.

The comments I’ve seen on social media suggest there is case law that says each round fired must be independently justified as “reasonable.” They make this claim based on the premise that the shot fired through the front windshield must be evaluated separately from the shots fired though the passenger window, and if either are “unreasonable” then the ICE officer committed a crime. That’s just nonsense and I’d like to see anyone post in the comments a citation to a case saying that is the law.

Two issues relevant to the shooting of Ms. Good are addressed by Justice Alito in his opinion.

Under the circumstances at the moment when the shots were fired, all that a reasonable police officer could have concluded was that Rickard was intent on resuming his flight and that, if he was allowed to do so, he would once again pose a deadly threat for others on the road….

In light of the circumstances we have discussed, it is beyond serious dispute that Rickard’s flight posed a grave public safety risk, and here, as in Scott, the police acted reasonably in using deadly force to end that risk.

The fact that comments on X and legal beagle pundits want to claim that this poor woman in Minneapolis was not a real threat to the safety of anyone — based on their 20-20 hindsight — is best discounted and ignored on the basis that they weren’t standing in front of her car when she shifted into drive and pushed the accelerator. Had they been, they might have come away with a different impression of the threat she posed to the safety other others in the area had she been allowed to drive away.

On the issue of the multiple rounds fired by the ICE Officer:

We now consider respondent’s contention that, even if the use of deadly force was permissible, petitioners acted unreasonably in firing a total of 15 shots. We reject that argument. It stands to reason that, if police officers are justified in firing at a suspect in order to end a severe threat to public safety, the officers need not stop shooting until the threat has ended. As petitioners noted below, “if lethal force is justified, officers are taught to keep shooting until the threat is over.”

… This would be a different case if petitioners had initiated a second round of shots after an initial round had clearly incapacitated Rickard and had ended any threat of continued flight, or if Rickard had clearly given himself up. But that is not what happened.

The “threat” question isn’t limited to the threat Good posed to the ICE Officer himself. The question extends to the threat that Good represented to public safety. This renders meaningless all the arguments made based on the claim that she had passed him and he was no longer threatened by her car.

THAT IS NOT THE LAW. QUIT PAYING ATTENTION TO IDIOTS.

Barnes v. Felix — 2025.

Justice Kagan wrote for a unanimous Court, but the issues relevant to the Minneapolis shooting are addressed by Justice Kavaugh in a Concurring opinion in which three other Justices joined.

The issue addressed by Justice Kagan’s majority opinion was the Court’s rejection of a “refinement” of the “reasonableness” test for Fourth Amendment claims. The Fifth Circuit developed a “moment in time” approach it applied in cases involving the use of “deadly” force, compared to a less restrictive approach used in cases involving claims of “excessive” force when reaching a determination on the “reasonableness” of the Officer’s actions.

The “moment in time” analysis introduced a temporal element — what amount of time prior to the decision to use deadly force could be considered in an evaluation of the reasonableness of the decision? The “moment in time analysis directed the the district judge to identify the time period under the facts of the case relevant just to the decision to use deadly force, and then consider only the facts and circumstances within that time period in judging the reasonableness of the decision.

In the usual excessive-force case … the inquiry into reasonableness would involve considering a variety of circumstances. But when an officer has used deadly force, the [district] court continued, “the Fifth Circuit has developed a much narrower approach.” Then, a court could ask only about the situation existing “at the moment of the threat” that sparked the fatal shooting…. The District Court identified that moment as “the two seconds before Felix fired his first shot,” when he was standing on the doorsill of moving vehicle. At that moment, the court found, an officer could reasonably think himself “at risk of serious harm.” And under the Fifth Circuit’s rule, that fact alone concluded the analysis.

The Supreme Court reversed on the basis that the “moment in time” analysis was contrary to the Court’s established “totality of circumstances” test for determining “reasonableness,” a test that has no temporal limit.

That inquiry into the reasonableness of police force requires analyzing the “totality of the circumstances”.… [D]eciding whether a use of force was objectively reasonable demands “careful attention to the facts and circumstances” relating to the incident, as then known to the officer. For example, the “severity of the crime” prompting the stop can carry weight in the analysis. So too can actions the officer took during the stop, such as giving warnings or otherwise trying to control the encounter. And the stopped person’s conduct is always relevant because it indicates the nature and level of the threat he poses, either to the officer or to others.

[T]he “totality of the circumstances” inquiry into a use of force has no time limit. Of course, the situation at the precise time of the shooting will often be what matters most; it is, after all, the officer’s choice in that moment that is under review. But earlier facts and circumstances may bear on how a reasonable officer would have understood and responded to later ones.

In his concurring opinion, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett, Justice Kavanaugh observes some of the “circumstances” that arise in the context of a driver who evades a car-stop by driving away:

So even though most traffic stops end without incident, traffic stops are nonetheless inherently risky for police officers. And when, as in this case, the driver suddenly pulls away in the midst of a stop, the risks multiply. A driver speeding away from a traffic stop could easily endanger bystanders and other drivers … Moreover, the very “fact that a suspect flees when suspected of a minor offense,” such as speeding or a failure to pay tolls, “could well be indicative of a larger danger….” Fleeing from the traffic stop could suggest that the driver is preparing to commit or has committed a more serious crime—and is attempting to evade detection or arrest…. [A]s the tragic 2025 New Year’s terrorist attack in New Orleans illustrates, the driver might intend to use the car as a weapon.

The possibilities are many. But the key point is a commonsense one: A driver who speeds away from a traffic stop can pose significant dangers to both the officer and the surrounding community. The question when a driver flees, therefore, is not merely whether the underlying traffic violation “presents risks to public safety”—it is also “whether flight,” and what that flight might indicate or enable, “does so.”

The totality of circumstances relevant to the ICE Officer’s decision to use deadly force would have included not simply that Good was a “citizen protester” concerned about the removal policies of the Trump Administration, but also that she had created a dangerous condition for others in parking her vehicle blocking a lane of traffic, had failed to comply with lawful commands to exit her vehicle, failed to heed lawful commands to stop as he put the vehicle in gear and began to move, the directions coming from her partner to “drive” while the Officer was in front of her vehicle, his observations of her and her conduct through the front windshield, her turning the wheel into his direction and bringing the front end around to face him directly, and then beginning to accelerate with the car in “Drive.”

As noted in the Scott case quoted above, “We think the police need not have taken that chance and hoped for the best. Whereas [the Officer’s] action … was certain to eliminate the risk that respondent posed to the public, ceasing pursuit was not.”

In various posts on X I have commented extensively on the videos that have been made public. Not a single one leads me to doubt the reasonableness of the ICE Officer’s decision. There is not doubt that he was at physical risk of harm or death when Good reoriented her front end to face him while she reversed.

When she braked, stopped, shifted into Drive, and hit the accelerator, he REACTED immediately by removing his weapon — something he had not done to that point because he did not perceive a risk until she did that.

The nonesense about him walking in front of her vehicle ignores that she reoriented her vehicle’s front end in relationship to him when she turned the wheel one way while reversed, and the opposite way when starting forward.

It may have been a poor choice by the Officer to expose himself even to the extent of making that possible, but that does not inure to the benefit of her by claiming he was in the wrong. That idea only exists in the fevered dreams of lunatic lefty legal beagles and idiots on social media.

Many have mischaracterized the policy prohibition of walking in front of — or shooting into — a “moving vehicle.” Her vehicle as stationary, and the Officer had had already done a complete 360 walk around the vehicle while it was stationary and engaged with the driver.

He may have exposed himself unnecessarily to danger by walking back towards the front a second time, but he did not do so FOR THE PURPOSE of justifying the use of deadly force. The policy prohibits an officer from purposely stepping in front of a moving vehicle to create risk of injury in order to justify use of lethal force.

Same for the policy that prohibits shooting into a moving vehicle — the policy does NOT apply to use of lethal force in self-defense, it only applies to situations where the shooting is done for no purpose other than to prevent the driver from escaping.

These are POLICIES adopted by law enforcement agencies as “best practices.” An unjustified deviation or violation of the policy might subject the officer to discipline.

But they do not alter “lawful v. unlawful” and “constitutional v. unconstitutional” determinations.

These are the only images I needed to see to form my opinion.

[

](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!nMEA!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F76e0e5ed-3024-4d76-a0fe-06405dbe8fc0_1388x762.png)

One ICE Officer is approaching her car and giving her lawful commands through her open driver’s side window. The car is in “Reverse” and her wheels are cut to the left. There is no ICE Officer to her front.

[

](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!6i22!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5260dadb-9604-4a36-a7e7-8360a7467af4_1414x814.png)

Here she has moved approximately 3 feet back as you can see from the relationship of her tires to the white line in both images. The ICE Officer to her front is still visible. In this image her “Reverse” white tail lights are off — she has shifted into drive. Her front tires are still cut to the left, and her front end has reoriented more towards the Officer now in the center of her front end.

[

](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!gLjk!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fcd1f0711-2c0b-4725-9f33-75786d3637dc_1360x814.png)

This is as far backwards as she travels. Her brake lights are now off — she’s in “Drive” and her foot is no longer on the brake. The ICE Officer is now in front of her driver’s side headlight, and her wheels are facing straight ahead. At this moment her front wheels break traction as she attempts to accelerate forward. Had the tires not spun on the ice she would have made immediate and forceful contact.

[

](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!M7Cx!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc5baef33-4523-4a00-9044-5972df7cd381_1360x814.png)

Just a fraction of a second later you see the ICE Officer drawing his firearm — her wheels are still straight. That’s the moment he decided to use deadly force — he recognized at that moment the fact that she was about to run him over. He resorted to deadly force in self-defense and defense of others.

That’s it.

As a federal prosecutor, if tasked to evaluate the lawfulness of his decision to use deadly force, I would have cleared him based on these four images and the video source alone. No other video produced so far does anything to call that conclusion into question.

What the driver’s intentions might have been are irrelevant. The one thing she clearly did not intend to do was to comply with the lawful orders she was given. As a result, she opened herself up to the consequences of the reasonable decision by the ICE Officer to eliminate the threat she posed to him as well as others.

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Renee Nicole Good Death: How Leftist Protest Tactics Contributed | National Review

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  • Policy push: Democrats in blue jurisdictions leverage Renee Good shooting to press for removal of federal immigration enforcement and end local deportations.
  • Critique of enforcement: Some argue ICE’s broad dragnet and training deficiencies contribute to violent encounters and reckless behavior.
  • Fact mismatch: Good, a citizen, was not targeted by ICE until she inserted herself into an operation, so her death did not stem from the deportation dragnet.
  • Agent profile: The agent involved had ten years of ICE experience, served in an elite tactical unit, and had prior vehicle-stop incidents, undermining claims of inadequate training.
  • ICE Watch tactic focus: Good participated in ICE Watch, a network that monitors ICE, alerts allies, and sometimes interferes with arrests, including blocking vehicles.
  • Conflict intent: ICE Watch aims to disrupt deportations and provoke confrontations that garner attention and discredit enforcement efforts.
  • Direct-action escalation: Constant appeals to direct action can encourage violence and personalized confrontations, potentially leading to extremism and plots.
  • Responsibility question: Democrats should consider whether they support tactics that could cause violent confrontations, as such encouragement may shift blame to proponents.

D emocrats in Minnesota, Oregon, and other blue areas have leaped at the political opportunity presented by the ICE shooting of Renee Nicole Good to demand what they were already advocating all along: the complete removal of federal immigration enforcement from their jurisdictions, thus ensuring an end to deportations of illegal aliens in those places. Their argument is that the confrontation that led to Good’s death was an inevitable consequence of the Trump administration’s broad dragnet and aggressive street-level tactics in rounding up illegal aliens for deportation. More sophisticated critics, such as Jeremiah Johnson in The Dispatch, argue that Good’s death “was the inevitable outcome of an immigration enforcement apparatus that has been poorly trained, sheltered from consequences, and empowered to behave recklessly.”

With a different set of facts, these critiques might have some validity. Large-scale deportations require a lot of law-enforcement interactions with people who very much don’t want to be apprehended, some of them violent, others just desperate. That greatly increases the odds of violence (and is only a modest preview of what the left’s preferred gun-confiscation policies would look like). There are very fair policy debates over whether the benefits of such a broad deportation policy really outweigh the costs. And there are genuine and fair concerns that ICE, having staffed up very rapidly, has recruited too many sketchy people and trained them inadequately — concerns that don’t necessarily nullify the legitimacy of the mission of deporting a lot of people who are in the country illegally.

But none of those criticisms have anything to do with the death of Renee Nicole Good. They don’t fit the facts. And more importantly, they go out of their way to ignore the actual cause of her death, which is likely to produce more dangerous and possibly deadly encounters of this kind: the leftist strategy of direct-action protest.

Good’s death wasn’t the natural result of the deportation dragnet. She was a citizen, one who hadn’t even lived in Minneapolis that long, and there’s no reason to believe that ICE was investigating her as a possible deportee. There’s no sign that ICE was interested in her at all — until she inserted herself in their business. Nor was she some bystander caught in a crossfire between ICE agents and someone else they wanted to apprehend. So, there’s nothing in ICE’s strategy or tactics that put her inevitably in their crosshairs. She had to actively try to make herself a target for an ICE agent. That was her choice, not ICE’s.

Nor was her death the result of poor training by the current Department of Homeland Security. The agent who fired the shots had reportedly been with ICE for ten years and was assigned to an elite tactical unit. He was an experienced agent who had previous experience with vehicle stops, including one last year in which he was dragged by a vehicle. That doesn’t place his decisions above criticism, but it does suggest that those decisions were not the result of inexperience, hasty recruitment, or inadequate training within the past twelve months.

Now, consider why she was there. As Steven Vago, Chris Nesi and Natalie O’Neill of the New York Post reported, Good “was part of a group of activists who worked to ‘document and resist’ the federal immigration crackdown in Minnesota . . . Good became involved in ‘ICE Watch’ — a loose coalition of activists dedicated to disrupting ICE raids in the sanctuary city . . . Coalitions similar to ICE Watch have cropped up all over the country — with activists using phone apps, whistles and car horns to warn neighborhoods when ICE shows up. ICE Watch and adjacent groups can also turn confrontational — with numerous instances of activists ramming agents with their cars in the past.” 

As the Post report notes, “ICE agents have faced an unprecedented spike in car attacks, surging by some 3,200 percent over the last year, shocking data released by the Department of Homeland Security revealed to The Post.”

Our own Haley Strack has more in depth-reporting on ICE Watch:

ICE Watch chapters, which have cropped up in communities across the country in recent years, train activists to monitor ICE activity using purpose-built apps and alert allies who have been trained to flood an operation area and interfere with arrests being made. An Instagram account identified as “MN Ice Watch” instructs to report the locations and appearances of ICE agents. The account has posted photos across Minneapolis of law-enforcement agents, vehicle license plate numbers, and ICE officers’ faces; the account generates information via anonymous reports and submissions from local activists.

On a tab titled “Education,” the account promotes information about how to “de-arrest” individuals who have been arrested by law-enforcement by “physically removing an arrestee from a law enforcement officer’s grips, opening the door of a car or pressuring law enforcement officers to release an arrestee.” The “de-arrest primer” goes on to describe the benefits of blocking police vehicles. “If you don’t have a crowd asserting pressure there may be some interference charges that come with blocking a police vehicle that may be more easily handed down for only one or two people blocking a police vehicle, but in many cases these are misdemeanor offenses and catch and release,” the primer notes.

Read the whole thing; this is far beyond simply engaging in protest speech to bring attention to a political controversy or an injustice. It’s a campaign that aims at two ends, neither of which is mutually exclusive: thwarting the enforcement of laws passed by Congress, and/or provoking conflict and confrontation with armed federal agents in the hope of discrediting the enforcement of those laws. And ICE Watch chapters and similar organizations are doing this sort of thing all across the country. Good’s death is the inevitable, and to some extent intended, outcome of this style of direct action, which is designed to create headline-grabbing conflict and drama.

Direct action is a longstanding leftist protest approach, which predates the Trump era by decades. In its broadest definition, the term can simply mean staging a fairly passive conflict with an unjust law and demonstrating that injustice by provoking arrests — think of civil rights-era arrests of lunch-counter sit-ins. Progressives and liberals tend to think that all forms of direct action are harmless or beneficial because of this heritage. But the justice of the civil rights movement does not retroactively justify every tactic that was used in its cause, and not every tactic is equally virtuous.

The immediate risk of constant appeals to direct action is that it tends to encourage violence in the protesters. If you tell people to get in the faces of others, to bring a gun to a knife-fight, to give your political opponents no rest at home or at work, or otherwise to engage in direct, personal confrontations rather than simply appeal by speech to the general public, you will trigger in some of your audience a desire to go the next logical step. While that’s always a risk in high-octane political rhetoric, it’s a much more vibrant risk when you advocate not just a profound emotional animus but also a tactic of close, personalized confrontation.

This is how you get the assassinations, assassination attempts, and assassination plots against Donald Trump, Charlie Kirk, Brett Kavanaugh (and his fellow justices), and UnitedHealthcare CEO Brian Thompson, among others. It’s how you get senators chased into elevators and out of restaurants, protests at Supreme Court justices’ homes, speakers shouted off campuses, and all manner of volatile confrontations. It’s an approach specifically geared to create a climate of fear of physical violence in its targets, and to set both the protesters and the targets on the very edge of their last nerve. Even when we can justify this kind of thing in American history, from the Boston Tea Party to the Vigilance Committees that thwarted the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act, what we tend to see at the end of that road is revolution or civil war.

This is why the question of the day right now for every Democratic politician and commentator in this country should not be how much they hate ICE and its agents, or whether they want to see federal law nullified by disabling its enforcement. It should be whether they encourage ICE Watch and other similar tactics of creating potentially violent confrontations by protesters inserting themselves in the face of agents on duty to obstruct the enforcement of the law. Because if they do, the blood is on their hands, not ICE’s.

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bogorad
1 day ago
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Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain
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